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The Police Power and the Takings Clause
D. BENJAMIN BARROS*
INTRODUCTION
One of the more enduring puzzles in constitutional law is the prob-
lem of regulatory takings, and it has become something of a ritual to
begin articles on the issue by noting the widespread confusion that the
doctrine has caused.1 This Article seeks to clarify the regulatory takings
debate by examining the scope and nature of the police power and dis-
cussing its relationship with the Just Compensation Clause.
The recent increase in federal regulation notwithstanding, the regu-
latory takings doctrine is primarily the product of challenges to state
police power regulations. But despite the centrality of the police power
to the problem of regulatory takings, an observation made nearly one
hundred years ago still holds true today: "No phrase is more frequently
* Litigation Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP, New York Office. Beginning Fall 2004,
Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law, Harrisburg Campus. Thanks to Julia
Miller and Jody King for their comments. The views expressed in this article are solely those of
the author.
1. See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143,
1143 (1997) ("Regulatory takings are widely regarded as a puzzle.... [T]he opening clich6 in
most of the scholarly commentary is that the law in this area is a bewildering mess."); Andrea L.
Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I - A Critique of Current
Takings Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1303-04 (1989) ("A major theme of this first Article is
that the Court's takings doctrine is in far worse shape than has generally been recognized -
indeed, that it is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual
disarray."); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984) (describing the regulatory takings problem as "intractable");
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) (noting that "more than one recent commentator has
described [regulatory takings jurisprudence] as a 'mess'.").
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used and at the same time less understood." 2 Contemporary regulatory
takings jurisprudence is plagued by misunderstandings about the police
power, in part because no one has seriously attempted to analyze or
define the police power since 19073 - fifteen years before the landmark
regulatory takings case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon4 was decided by
the United States Supreme Court.
The uncertainty and confusion over the police power, however, is
unnecessary. The term "police power" was introduced and defined by
the Supreme Court, and has a clear meaning as a concept of American
constitutional law - though one that unfortunately has been ignored in
contemporary takings jurisprudence. The purpose of this Article is to
explore the precise nature of the police power and its lessons for clarify-
ing the regulatory takings debate.
Part I of this Article addresses the question: "What is the police
power?" It begins by discussing the early federalism cases in which the
Supreme Court introduced and defined the phrase "police power" to be
synonymous with the entirety of the states' sovereign power. It then
examines the practical development of police regulations in the state
courts, including the landmark decision Commonwealth v. Alger5 and
the evolution from community-based common-law regulation toward the
modem regulatory state. Finally, it discusses various attempts to limit
the scope of the police power, from Lochner-era substantive due process
to various academic definitions of the police power based on political
theory. Part I concludes that the police power, as a concept of American
constitutional law, is synonymous with the entirety of the sovereign
power of the states that remained after the constitutional grant of limited
powers to the federal government.
Part II discusses the interaction between the police power and the
Just Compensation Clause. It begins with the ambiguous foundation of
modem regulatory takings, Justice Holmes's cryptic opinion in Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon. Placing the holding in Mahon in the context of
Holmes's prior writings on the police power and his substantive due
process dissents shows that Holmes understood the broad scope of the
police power while at the same time rejected the formalistic rule that
exercises of the police power could never be takings. Part II then exam-
ines the historical record and text of the Just Compensation Clause, and
concludes that the central holding in Mahon - that exercises of the
police power can in some circumstances be takings - is correct when
2. Walter Wheeler Cook, What is the Police Power?, 7 COLUM. L. REv. 322, 322 (1907).
3. See id.
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
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an exercise of the police power renders the property in question value-
less, but not when the exercise of the police power results in a lesser
diminution of the property's value.
Part II then looks to the nature and scope of the police power, and
the history and text of the Just Compensation Clause, to make a few
observations that help to clarify the regulatory takings problem. Much
of the confusion in regulatory takings is due to a misunderstanding of
the nature and scope of the police power, which has led to the regulatory
takings question being framed in incorrect terms. Most significantly,
recognition that the broad scope of the police power is not tied to the
prevention of harm helps demonstrate that the character of the govern-
ment act in question should have no place in the regulatory takings
inquiry, and that its central role in contemporary regulatory takings
cases is misplaced. When properly stated, the regulatory takings ques-
tion should simply ask whether the government act has rendered the
property in question valueless - if the answer is yes, then compensation
is due. Finally, Part II concludes that despite their analytical incoher-
ence, the Supreme Court's contemporary takings cases have reached
results that are consistent with both the historical record and text of the
Just Compensation Clause.
I. WHAT IS THE POLICE POWER?
The term "police power" is generally, but vaguely, understood in
American jurisprudence to refer to state regulatory power. Most opin-
ions and articles on regulatory takings do not move beyond this general
notion; those that do look further typically misapprehend the police
power's history, nature, and scope. As a result, attempts to solve the
problem of regulatory takings continuously have suffered because of a
lack of understanding of the nature of the police power.
The confusion about the police power has many sources. "Police
power" was introduced by the Supreme Court in federalism cases, where
the Court was attempting to define the border between federal and state
authority, but later came to prominence in cases testing the scope of
state power under the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses. Per-
haps the best early work on the scope of the police power, by W. G.
Hastings, was published in a non-legal journal and has escaped the
notice of many contemporary writers.6 Further, many academic theo-
rists have failed to distinguish between "police power," the American
constitutional law concept, and related ideas in political theory.
6. W. G. Hastings, The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions Relating to the
Police Power of the State, 39 PRoc. AM. PriL. Soc'y 359 (1900).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
This Part discusses the introduction and evolution of the term
"police power," examining the initial definition of the term by the
Supreme Court, the practical evolution of the police power as exercised
by the states, and various attempts to define (and often to limit) the
scope of the police power, including Lochner-era substantive due pro-
cess. It concludes that "police power" is synonymous and coextensive
with state power - a seemingly simple conclusion that potentially clari-
fies the regulatory takings debate.
A. Introduction of a Legal Term
The term "police power" was introduced in the Marshall and Taney
Courts' attempts to delimit the scope of federal and state authority. It
was first used in 1827 by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland,7
a challenge to a Maryland regulation that required importers of foreign
goods to obtain a license and pay a fee of fifty dollars.8 The plaintiff
argued that this requirement violated the Commerce Clause and the con-
stitutional prohibition on state taxes on imports. Maryland, represented
by future Chief Justice Taney, argued that to find the regulation uncon-
stitutional would undermine the state's ability to protect its citizens
against dangerous imports such as gunpowder.9 Marshall rejected
Taney's argument and found the regulation to be unconstitutional, but in
doing so acknowledged, "The power to direct removal of gunpowder is a
branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to
remain, with the States.' °
While this was the first use of the term police power, the Chief
Justice did not come up with it out of thin air. As Hastings noted, the
term came to Marshall "by degrees" in other cases dealing with the
scope of state authority in the federal system." In the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case, decided in 1819, Marshall wrote that the framers of the Con-
stitution did not intend to restrain the states in the regulation of their
civil institutions adopted for internal government. ' 2 A few years later, in
the 1824 case Gibbons v. Ogden,'3 Marshall discussed this state power
using the term "police" several times, at one point referring to "[t]he
acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade,
and to govern its own citizens."' 4
7. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
8. Id. at 420.
9. Id. at 427-28.
10. Id. at 443.
11. Hastings, supra note 6, at 363.
12. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 628 (1819).
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14. Id. at 208.
[Vol. 58:471
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Marshall did not do anything unusual in using the word "police" to
describe state power. At the time, "police" had several meanings relat-
ing to government. The term was used to refer broadly to civilization or
civil organization, 5 and "public police" meant the equivalent of public
policy.' 6 From these usages, the term "police" evolved to mean the reg-
ulation and administration of the civil community and the enforcement
of the community's laws and public order.' 7 Blackstone's widely
quoted description of the public police as "the due regulation and
domestic order of the kingdom"' 8 is an influential example of this usage.
At the time of the drafting of the United States Constitution, the use
of the word "police" to refer to a sovereign entity's power to govern and
regulate was not unusual. In giving the federal government limited and
enumerated powers, the Constitution left the remaining sovereign
authority of the United States with the individual states. This remaining
authority is described as "residuary sovereignty" in The Federalist,9
and at its broadest consists of, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Gib-
bons v. Ogden that "immense mass of legislation, which embraces every
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general gov-
ernment.""° As Hastings noted, the phrase "residuary sovereignty" was
not widely used.2 ' Instead, courts and commentators referred to specific
state powers, such as eminent domain and taxation, or spoke more
15. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED]. As examples of
this usage, the OED cites, inter alia, a letter by Edmund Burke decrying the lack of civilization of
the Turks and a book on ants. Id.
16. Id. One example of this usage given by the OED is from a Scottish treatise: "If... the
public police shall require that a highway be carried through the property of a private person." Id.
17. Id.
18. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (1769).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 228 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001) ("The exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, was probably meant
as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the states .... "); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 320
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) ("[T]he equal vote allowed to
each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.").
20. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 203.
21. Hastings, supra note 6, at 363. Hastings wrote:
[The term "residuary sovereignty"] seems not to have to have obtained generally,
perhaps because it served no one's political needs. It is hard to find it outside of The
Federalist. It suited those who wished to magnify the states and who feared the
growth of power on the part of the national government to omit the qualifying
adjective. It suited those to whom encroachments and separatist tendencies on the
part of the states were a terror not to couple the words "States" and "Sovereignty"
together, even with the qualification.
Id. The courts occasionally used the term to describe the scope of state sovereignty in the federal
system. See, e.g., Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 515 (1856) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) ("It is sufficient for the decision of this case to ascertain whether the residuary
sovereignty of the States or people has been invaded by the 8th section of the act.").
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broadly of the state's power act to promote "public justice" or enact
"police regulations."22 In the constitutional debates, the term "internal
police" was used to describe the area of exclusive state sovereignty.23
Although Brown v. Maryland was the first use of "police power," it
was the 1837 case Mayor of New York v. Miln 4 that brought the term
into wide use.2 Miln involved a challenge to a New York City regula-
tion that required the master of every vessel arriving in the port of New
York to give the city authorities a record of every passenger arriving
from another state or country, including name, birthplace, age, and occu-
pation.26 In upholding the regulation, both the Opinion of the Court by
Justice Barbour and Justice Thompson's concurrence used the term
"police power," but both Justices also used other terms such as "regula-
tion of internal police" to convey the same idea.27
Five years later, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,28 the Court again dis-
cussed the police power, no longer using the term "tentatively and as a
briefer substitute for fuller expressions."29 In Prigg, the Court voided a
Pennsylvania law under which the appellant had been convicted for for-
cibly removing a black woman from Pennsylvania to Maryland. In the
Opinion of the Court, Justice Story made it clear that the problem with
the law was that it was contrary to the federal Fugitive Slave Law, and
that the Court's action should not "be understood, in any manner what-
soever, to doubt or to interfere with the police power belonging to the
states, in virtue of their general sovereignty."3 While the Justices dis-
agreed on the exclusiveness of federal power in this area, the various
opinions in Prigg use the term "police power" to represent the general
sovereign power of the states.3
The process of defining "police power" reached its conclusion in
22. Hastings, supra note 6, at 363.
23. In debating the respective authority of the federal and state legislatures, Mr. Sherman of
Connecticut proposed language that would give the federal government the authority "to make
laws binding on the people of the United States in all cases which may concern the common
interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the government of the individual states in any
matters of internal police which respect the government of such states only, and wherein the
general welfare of the United States is not concerned." 5 ELLIOT's DEBATES 319-20 (J.B.
Lippincott Co. 1941) (1836) (emphasis added). Similar language appears in id. at 462.
24. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
25. See Hastings, supra note 6, at 365-67.
26. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 102.
27. See Hastings, supra note 6, at 367.
28. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
29. Hastings, supra note 6, at 373.
30. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625.
31. Id. at 625, 637, 657.
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the License3 2 and Passenger Cases.3 3 These cases concerned the ques-
tion of whether the state police power and the federal commerce power
overlap, or whether they form mutually exclusive spheres of authority.
In both cases, Chief Justice Taney and Justice McLean were the strong-
est proponents of the opposing sides, with Taney arguing that the two
powers overlap and McLean arguing that the two are exclusive. Both
Justices, however, agreed that the police power was a product of state
sovereignty. In the License Cases, Chief Justice Taney wrote:
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to
the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine
law, or a law to punish offences, or to establish courts of justice, or
requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same powers; that
is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and
things within the limits of its dominion.34
In other words, the police power and state sovereignty are synonymous.
Justice Taney's examples are critical to understanding the police
power's full scope. Although today the police power is most often
thought of as a regulatory power, it is in fact much more. A state does
not regulate when it "establish[es] courts of justice." A state's police
powers are "the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to
the extent of its dominions;" and, therefore, at its broadest the police
power includes other, more discrete, state powers. A state exercises its
sovereignty; and, therefore, the police power, when it establishes a court
of law; enacts a land-use regulation that permits a parcel of property to
be used as a courthouse; takes that property by eminent domain to be
used for a courthouse; or taxes other property to pay for the construction
and operation of the courthouse.35
The widespread notion that the police power is purely regulatory is
largely due to historical circumstance. Although the police power was
defined in federalism cases, the term came into widespread use in legal
actions challenging the scope of police regulations. The next section
32. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
33. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
34. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 583. Justice McLean used similar language: "The States, resting
upon their original basis of sovereignty, subject only to the exceptions, stated, exercise their
powers over every thing connected with their social and internal condition." Id. at 588 (McLean,
J., dissenting).
35. The fact that at its broadest the police power can be seen to include the power of eminent
domain is not a predicate to the conclusion set forth below that exercises of the police power can
violate the Just Compensation Clause. See infra Part II. It does, however, reinforce the
hollowness of any formal distinction between exercises of eminent domain and exercises of the
police power in the regulatory takings analysis. See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
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discusses the evolution of regulation enacted under the police power,
while the following section discusses various attempts by courts and
legal scholars, motivated either by a desire to limit state power or by a
desire to create a more orderly conception of state power, to circum-
scribe the legitimate ends of the police power.
B. Police Power and Police Regulation: The Evolution of
Regulation by the State
Because the Supreme Court introduced the term "police power" in
the context of cases delimiting federal and state power, it is not surpris-
ing that the term was defined theoretically and broadly to mean state
sovereign power. But the police power is by definition state power, and
as a result, its practical scope evolved in cases testing the validity of
state actions. These cases exclusively concerned the validity of police
regulations (i.e., regulations enacted under the police power), and as a
result, the police power almost immediately came to be considered a
regulatory power.
According to the traditional account of the history of state regula-
tion, widespread regulation under the police power was not common
before the late nineteenth century. But, contrary to the traditional
account, early America was "well regulated" (to use William J. Novak's
term), and American courts were not strangers to police regulations,
even if they were not referred to as such. Novak has cataloged the wide
range of regulations enacted under the rich common law tradition preva-
lent in early America in his book The People's Welfare.3 6
The practical scope of police regulation, however, has evolved
throughout American history. Perhaps the most important step in the
practical evolution of police regulation came in the 1851 case Common-
wealth v. Alger,37 which analytically linked the common law doctrines
that formed the basis of early American police regulations to the broad
36. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE (1996); see also John F. Hart, Land Use
Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
1099, 1107-31 (2000) [hereinafter Hart, Land Use Law] (discussing colonial-era land use
regulations); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259-81 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial Land Use] (also
discussing colonial-era land use regulations); William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal
Origins of State Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1076-77 (1994) (listing regulations
enacted by the New York legislature between 1781 and 1801); William J. Novak, Salus Populi:
The Roots of Regulation in America, 1787-1873, at 6 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis University) (http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/brandeis/preview-img/9217499/21); Treanor,
supra note 1, at 788-89 (discussing compensation and regulations). As early as 1388, sanitary
laws regulating the disposal of garbage and the slaughter of cattle were enacted in England. W. P.
PRENTICE, THE POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY 8 (1894)
(citing D. B. EATON, SANITARY LEGISLATION (1872)).
37. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (Mass. 1851).
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conception of government power reflected in the term "police power" as
defined by the Supreme Court. By freeing police regulation from the
common law doctrines that represented its early practical scope, Alger
formed the intellectual basis for the broad regulatory scheme prevalent
today.
This Section discusses Alger and its significance to the develop-
ment of the practical scope of regulation under the police power. It then
briefly discusses the evolution of American regulation after Alger. It is
important, however, to note at the outset that this Section discusses the
evolution of police regulation, not evolution of the police power.
Although its practical scope has evolved over time, the police power
itself has not. The police power, by definition, has always been the
residuary sovereign power of the states.
1. TRANSCENDING THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
In Alger, one of the nation's great judges, Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, made what is widely
credited to be the first practical explication of the police power.38
Shaw's biographer, Leonard Levy, does not exaggerate when he calls
Alger "one of the most influential and frequently cited [opinions] in con-
stitutional law."39
Alger was a challenge to a Massachusetts law that restricted water-
front property holders' right to build wharves in certain areas of Boston
harbor. The issue for the court, as framed by Shaw, was: "What are the
just powers of the legislature to limit, control, or regulate the exercise
and enjoyment of [a property owner's] rights."4° Shaw began his analy-
sis into the respective rights of property holder and legislature with the
"settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil soci-
ety, that every holder of property ... holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others ... nor injurious to the rights of the commu-
nity."'" The police power, to Shaw, was simply the government's power
to enact such regulations for the good and welfare of the community as
it sees fit, subject to the limitations that the regulations be both reasona-
38. See Harry N. Scheiber, State Police Power, in 5 ENCY. AM. CONST. at 2505 (Leonard W.
Levy & Kenneth I. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000).
39. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 247-48
(1957).
40. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 65.
41. Id. at 84-85.
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ble4' and constitutional.43 Shaw conceded, "It is much easier to perceive
and realize the existence and sources of this power, than to mark its
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise. ' 44
Shaw was one of the first, but by no means the last, writers to have
difficulty defining the scope of the police power in a practical setting.
While he acknowledged that the outer limits of the police power are
indistinct, he noted that there are many cases where the reasonableness
and propriety of a government regulation are obvious to "all well regu-
lated minds. 4 5 Such obviously legitimate regulations include the prohi-
bition of warehousing gunpowder in inhabited areas, construction rules
designed to limit the risk of fire, and use regulations prohibiting the
location of contagious disease hospitals.46
Although prohibitions on such uses diminish the value of the prop-
erty and cause economic harm to the property owner, Shaw argued that
they do not require compensation because they are exercises of the
police power, not the power of eminent domain. Shaw's position is con-
sistent with the generally accepted doctrine at the time, discussed below,
that the obligation to compensate was limited to exercises of eminent
domain. Shaw, however, had difficulty defining the respective scopes of
these two powers, saying that the distinction between them is "manifest
in principle, although the facts and circumstances of different cases are
so various, that it is often difficult to decide whether a particular exer-
cise of legislation is properly attributable to the one or the other of these
two acknowledged powers."4 7 One such distinction is manifest in the
police regulations mentioned by Justice Shaw, in that each is "the
restraint of an injurious private use by the owner. ' 48 The public
enforces such restraints, not because it intends to "make any use of the
property [which it would obtain through eminent domain] .. . but
because it would be a noxious use, contrary to the maxim, sic utere tuo,
ut alienum non laedas," which it would prohibit through the police
power.49
Shaw's attempt to make a principled distinction between eminent
domain and the police power was understandable. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, it was widely accepted that just compensation was required only
42. Id. at 85; see also Levy, supra note 39, at 254 n.91 ("Shaw intended that reasonableness
be judged by the legislature, not by the judiciary.").
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for physical takings, and regulatory restraints on property were generally
considered to be outside of the scope of the Takings Clause. Catego-
rizing the law that prohibited Alger from building his wharf as a regula-
tion allowed Shaw to deny Alger's claim for compensation. By using
the new term "police power," Shaw tried to explain this rule in terms of
two distinct government powers, each serving a different purpose.
Shaw's discussion, however, had far more significance than its
statement of the rule that regulations could not amount to takings - a
distinction that the passage of time would show to be flawed.5 ° Some
commentators, notably Ernest Freund and Thomas Cooley, looked at
Shaw's sic utere language and concluded that Shaw's conception of the
police power was limited to regulation of noxious uses.5' Shaw's view
of the police power, however, was more complex. For Shaw, the police
power clearly included, but was not limited to, the regulation of those
uses that were contrary to the common law sic utere doctrine. Rather,
the legislature had the broad power "to declare what shall be deemed a
dangerous or noxious trade, under what circumstances and within what
distance of habitations it may or shall not be set up, how the use of it
shall be regulated, and to prohibit any other than such regulated use, by
specific penalties."52
The purpose of this broad power was twofold. First, the power was
intended to promote the public welfare. Second, and as important to
Shaw, the power was intended to establish clear and certain rules. Shaw
wrote:
Things done may or may not be wrong in themselves, or necessarily
injurious and punishable as such at common law; but laws are passed
declaring them offences, and making them punishable, because they
tend to injurious consequences; but more especially for the sake of
having a definite, known and authoritative rule which all can under-
stand and obey.53
As an example, Shaw referred to the case of a powder magazine. Shaw
wrote that while everyone agrees that building a powder magazine too
close to a village is a dangerous use, and would be punishable at com-
mon law, not everyone would agree on how close is too close. Some
might think two hundred feet, others two thousand, "but within this wide
margin, who shall say, who can know what distance shall be too near or
50. See infra notes 149-66 and accompanying text.
51. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 830-31 (7th ed. 1903)
[hereinafter COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS]; ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 405 (1904).
52. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 96.
53. Id. at 96.
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otherwise?" 54 Certainty is needed, and certainty can be provided only
by positive legislative enactments. This need gave the legislature the
authority to make a law "defining and securing the rights of the pub-
lic."'55 The law challenged in Alger thus legitimately established a point
beyond which wharves could not be built, and Alger's wharf was subject
to such regulation even though it was not intrinsically harmful.
The traditional account of the importance of Shaw's opinion to the
development of the police power describes Alger as a major innovation,
breaking with a laissez-faire tradition and ushering in an era of positivist
regulation. Shaw's conception of the police power, however, was not a
radical departure from the early nineteenth century tradition of common
regulation that formed the basis of his opinion." But Alger was instru-
mental in the evolution of positivist regulation. Alger's significance in
this respect comes from Shaw's acknowledgement of the legislature's
line drawing authority and joinder of the common law regulatory tradi-
tion with the new term "police power" and the broad conception of gov-
ernment authority that the term represented. Shaw held that state
authority to enact police regulations includes, but is not limited to, such
doctrines as sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas, and that the legislature
has broad authority to exercise this power. Alger thus analytically freed
police regulation from its common law origins, and provided an impor-
tant intellectual building block for the development of the modern regu-
latory state.57
2. EVOLUTION OF REGULATION BY THE POSITIVIST STATE
Although Alger was by no means the sole reason for this shift,
American regulation changed in both degree and kind beginning in the
1850s. 58 Perhaps the most profound example of this shift was the evolu-
tion of prohibitions on the manufacture of liquor - which later aroused
Justice Holmes's suspicion of the police power and formed part of the
foundation of his thinking about regulatory takings that culminated in
54. Id.
55. Id. at 104.
56. See NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE, supra note 36, at 19-21.
57. Novak is critical of the idea that Alger represented an innovation in American legal
thought. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE, supra note 36, at 20-21. In one sense, Novak is
correct - the regulation upheld in Alger was well within the early-American regulatory tradition,
and from that standpoint Alger was an "easy case." Id. at 21. But words and concepts are
important in legal analysis, and the marriage of the common law regulatory tradition with the new,
broad phrase "police power" changed the terms by which the question of the validity of a
particular regulation was asked. More importantly, by cogently explaining the importance of the
legislature's line drawing authority and ability to regulate uses that were not intrinsically harmful,
Shaw helped lay the intellectual foundation for the positivist regulatory state.
58. Id. at 104 n.107; see also id. at 236-37 (discussing differences between the early-
American regulatory tradition and the modem regulatory state.); id. at 242-43 (same).
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the landmark Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.59 Liquor and public morals
had been actively regulated in early America.6" But this regulatory tra-
dition "changed suddenly when temperance reformers ratcheted up the
polity for a new wave of legislative experimentation - state prohibi-
tion."6 As Novak wrote,
Prohibition marked a stunning departure in the legal and legislative
history of morals and liquor regulation. Power and discretion were
summarily taken out of the hands of communities and local officials
and replaced with blanket state-wide legislative bans on a remarkably
profitable activity . . . that previously enjoyed the sanction of law.
Thomas Cooley reflected on the momentous consequences: "The
trade in alcoholic drinks being lawful, and the capital employed in it
fully protected by the law, the legislature then steps in, and by enact-
ment based on general reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic,
destroyes altogether the employment, and reduces to a nominal value
the property on hand." He added, "The merchant of yesterday
becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he
lives becomes perhaps a nuisance. '"62
Along with other legislative innovations of the mid-1800s, "prohi-
bition and its legal/political repercussions transformed traditional under-
standings of the scope of legislation, the nature of rights, and the locus
of public power."" This shift was accompanied by "judicial invocations
of an 'inalienable police power' defined increasingly in terms of sover-
eignty and command rather than consent and common law precedent."'
With this shift toward positivist regulation in the mid- to late-
1800s, the practical conception of the police power at the state level
became divorced from its common-law roots, and many innovative regu-
lations were challenged under the doctrine of substantive due process as
exceeding the scope of the police power. Each of these police regula-
tions, however, was consistent with the broad conception of the police
power developed by Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases and by
59. See infra notes 168-74 and accompanying text. The profound evolution in government
power represented by state prohibition statutes also raised the suspicion of Justice Shaw, although
Shaw's suspicions were manifested through the application of procedural due process. See
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE, supra note 36, at 181-83.
60. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE, supra note 36, at 172-77.
61. Id. at 177.
62. Id. at 177 (quoting COOLEY, CONSTrrrrIONAL LimrrATIONS, supra note 51, at 583-84).
63. Id.; see also id. at 188 ("State prohibition involved a distinctively upward shift in the
locus of public decision-making power in the American polity. Morals police, including controls
on intoxicating liquors, had been the prerogative of local self-regulating communities for
centuries. With a simple fiat, state legislatures dissolved this tradition and a whole set of time-
honored expectations. It replaced a local, customary, and discretionary regime with a centralized,
rule-based, and stream-lined enforcement apparatus."). A similar shift occurred in other areas of
police regulation, including public health. See id. at 229-30.
64. Id. at 243.
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Chief Justice Shaw in Alger. With the Depression-era death of eco-
nomic substantive due process, discussed further below, the police
power returned in both theoretical and practical scope to the "power of
sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits [of
the states'] dominions."65
C. Attempts to Limit the Police Power
Judges and legal scholars have made many attempts to define the
police power or to draw boundaries around its scope. Writers of early
treatises tried to explain the police power in terms of the common law
theories reflected in cases that upheld police regulations. Courts have
often defined the police power by reference to the acknowledged legiti-
mate ends of the power, such as the promotion of the polity's health,
safety, and morals, and some commentators have attempted to limit the
police power to the pursuit of these ends. Many more commentators
have attempted to define the police power by reference to political
theory.
Some of these attempts at definition were motivated by a simple
desire to define a legal concept; others were ideological attempts to limit
the scope of the police power. Regardless of their motivation, however,
these attempts at definition and limitation err because they make one
consistent mistake: "Police power" is an American constitutional law
concept that was defined by the Supreme Court to be synonymous with
state power.
1. COOLEY AND TEIDEMAN - ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT TO
COMMON LAW DOCTRINES
In the late nineteenth century, a number of treatise writers analyzed
state power by cataloging court decisions and categorizing them as
exemplars of certain state powers. Some of these treatise writers were
simply trying to make sense of a confusing mass of case law,66 but the
two most influential treatise writers of the time, Thomas Cooley and
Christopher Teideman, were motivated by the desire to limit the scope
of state power. Cooley's landmark Constitutional Limitations67 and
Tiedeman's A Treatise on the Limitations of the Police Power in the
United States68 both attempted to do so by limiting the police power to
65. The License Cases, 46 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1848).
66. For example, W. P. Prentice argued that the origin of the police power was in the law of
necessity. Prentice, supra note 36, at 4.
67. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 51.
68. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES (1886).
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the enforcement of the common law sic utere doctrine. Motive aside,
however, all of these treatise writers made the same basic error, attempt-
ing to define the police power by reference to case law discussing spe-
cific police regulations, rather than to the Supreme Court case law that
defines the power itself.
Cooley's treatise was first published in 1868, the same year as the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was immensely influen-
tial on late nineteenth century legal thought.69 Cooley looked to Shaw's
sic utere language in Alger and concluded that the police power was
limited to prevention of harmful uses.7" This interpretation misreads
Alger, and confuses the ends of the police power that Shaw felt were
obvious to "all well regulated minds" with Shaw's broader and subtler
conception of the police power that included regulation of uses that may
not "be wrong in themselves, or necessarily injurious and punishable as
such at common law.'
Hostility to government regulation is more explicit in Tiedeman's
work than in Cooley's. Like many laissez faire legal scholars,
Tiedeman was strongly influenced by the Social Darwinist philosophy
of Herbert Spencer. Followers of Spencerian social thought were radi-
cally opposed to government regulation of economic affairs because it
interfered with the evolution of human society. As one Spencerian put
it: "Let it be understood that we cannot go outside of this alternative:
liberty, inequality, survival of the fittest; not liberty, equality, survival of
the unfittest. The former carries society forward and favors its best
members; the latter carries society downwards and favors its worst
members. '72 Tiedeman began his splenetic introduction to his treatise
by railing against government economic regulation, which he saw as the
unfortunate product of universal suffrage giving the ignorant masses the
power to impose the tyranny of the majority on the helpless "conserva-
tive classes." By demonstrating the constitutional limits of government
power, Tiedeman sought to protect "social order and liberty" against
"the radical experimentations of social reformers. 73
69. Alan R. Jones, Thomas M. Cooley, in 2 Ency. Am. Const 680 (Leonard W. Levy &
Kenneth I. Karst eds., 2d ed., 2000) ("The book ... had gone through six editions by 1890 and
had a broader circulation, a greater sale, and more frequent citation than any other law book
published in the second half of the nineteenth century.").
70. COOLEY, CONSTrrrMTIONAL LIMrrATIONS, supra note 51, at 830-31.
71. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 96 (Mass. 1851); see supra notes 50-54
and accompanying text; see also Hart, Land Use Law, supra note 36, at 1149 (noting that colonial-
era land use regulations demonstrate that the police power was not limited to the prevention of
harm).
72. TIEDEMAN, supra note 68, at vi-viii (1886) (quoting William Graham Sumner).
73. Id. at vi-viii. Tiedeman wrote:
[T]he sphere of governmental activity was confined within the smallest limits
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Toward this end, Tiedeman sought to limit the police power "to the
detailed enforcement of the legal maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non
laedas."7 4 To Tiedeman, the sic utere doctrine meshed perfectly with
Spencer's social theory:
Mr. Spencer's entire argument is based upon his first principle of
sociology: "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills provided
he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man," we most heart-
ily indorse as the ruling principle of police power in the United
States, and the necessary fundamental principle in every system of
sociology in a free State.75
But like Cooley before him, and Richard Epstein after him, 76 in his
effort to limit government power, Tiedeman confused examples of legit-
imate police regulations with the scope of the broader underlying police
power.
by the popularization of the so-called laissez-faire doctrine, which denies to
government the power to do more than to provide for the public order and personal
security by the prevention and punishment of crimes and trespasses. Under the
influence of this doctrine, the encroachments of government upon the rights and
liberties of the individual have for the past century been comparatively few. But the
political pendulum is again swinging in the opposite direction, and the doctrine of
governmental inactivity in economical matters is attacked daily with increasing
vehemence. Governmental interference is proclaimed and demanded everywhere as
a sufficient panacea for every social evil which threaten the prosperity of society.
Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized
world ....
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great army of discontents,
and their apparent power, with the growth and development of universal suffrage, to
enforce their views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the conservative classes
stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and more
unreasoning than any before experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic
majority.
The principal object of the present work is to demonstrate, by a detailed
discussion of the constitutional limitations upon the police power in the United
States, that under the written constitutions, Federal and State, democratic absolutism
is impossible in this country, as long as popular reverence for the constitutions, in
their restrictions upon governmental activity, is nourished and sustained by a prompt
avoidance by the courts of any violations of their provisions, in word or in spirit. ...
The police power of the government is shown to be confined to the detailed
enforcement of the legal maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.
If the author succeeds in any measure in his attempt to awaken the public mind to a
full appreciation of the power of constitutional limitations to protect private rights
against the radical experimentations of social reformers, he will feel that he has been
amply requited for his labors in the cause of social order and personal liberty."
Id.
74. Id. at vii.
75. Id. at 329.
76. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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2. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT TO ACKNOWLEDGED ENDS: HEALTH, SAFETY,
MORALS, AND WELFARE
Many courts and commentators have tried to define the police
power by reference to its acknowledged legitimate ends. Perhaps the
most influential example of this approach is Chief Justice Redfield's
opinion in Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R.77 In his opinion, Red-
field, the Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court, defined the
police power as the power by which the state restrained persons and
property "to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State."78 Although Thorpe appears to be the first instance of this usage,
many of the cases in which the police power developed referred to such
legitimate ends of government regulation as the state's safety, health,
morals, peace, and order.79
Cases such as Thorpe, however, should not be understood as limit-
ing the scope of the police power. In Thorpe, Justice Redfield wrote, "It
has never been questioned, so far as I know, that the American legisla-
tures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation which
resided in the British parliament, except where they are restrained by
77. 27 Vt. 140 (1855).
78. Id. at 150. Another influential construction is Justice Field's statement referring to the
police power as "the power of the state ... to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of
the state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity." Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
79. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 21 (1852) ("[T]he police power, although
designed essentially for other purposes-for the protection, safety, and peace of the State-may
essentially promote and aid the interests of [slave] owners."); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283, 408 (1849) (McLean, J.) ("In guarding the safety, health and morals of its citizens a
state is restricted to appropriate and constitutional means."); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
504, 536 (1847) ("The health laws, quarantine laws, ballast laws, &c., prove that the police power
may be extended to imports and importers, if the public safety or welfare demands it."); id. at 592
("And if the foreign article be injurious to the health or morals of the community, a State may, in
the exercise of that great and conservative police power which lies at the foundation of its
prosperity, prohibit the sale of it."); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842)
("The rights of the owners of fugitive slaves are in no just sense interfered with, or regulated, by
such a course; and in many cases, the operations of this police power, although designed generally
for other purposes, for protection, safety and peace of the state, may essentially promote and aid
the interest of the owners."); Brown v. Mayland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 431 (1827) (Marshall,
J.) ("[Tlhe police laws of the different States, made for their safety and health, exist only by the
permission of congress."); see also Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (1 I Pet.) 102, 148 (1837)
("Can anything fall more directly within the police power and internal regulation of a state, than
that which concerns the care and management of paupers or convicts, or any other class or
description of persons that may be thrown into the country, and likely to endanger its safety, or
become chargeable for their maintenance?"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 178 (1824)
("With regard to the quarantine laws, and other regulations of police, respecting the public health
in the several States, they do not partake of the character of regulation of the commerce of the
United States.").
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written constitutions."8 Thus, Justice Redfield's "comfort, health, and
prosperity" language should be understood to be referring to acknowl-
edged legitimate ends of government action, and not limiting the police
power to legislation that pursues these specific ends. Similarly, modem
cases that refer to specific ends of the police power do so in the context
of holding that a particular government action legitimately is aimed at
these ends, and do not purport to place limits on the police power
beyond those imposed constitutionally. 81
Various courts and commentators, however, have from time to time
attempted to restrict the scope of the police power by using its acknowl-
edged ends as limiting, rather than exemplary. The most famous exam-
ple is contained in the paragon of economic substantive due process,
Lochner v. New York.82
3. THE POLICE POWER IN THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCHNER-ERA
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, innovative
police power regulations were often challenged under the doctrine of
economic substantive due process. It is not the aim of this Article to
provide a thorough examination of economic substantive due process.
But the doctrine represented a significant attempt to limit the scope of
the police power, and the nature of the police power plays an important
role in the Supreme Court cases that represent both the apex and the
demise of economic substantive due process - Lochner and Nebbia v.
New York.
83
Lochner involved a challenge to a New York law limiting the hours
worked in bakeries to sixty hours per week. In the Opinion of the Court,
Justice Peckham began his analysis of the statute by noting, "There are
... certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union,
somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limi-
tation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers,
broadly stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific
limitation, relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the
80. Thorpe, 27 Vt. at 142.
81. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys. v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 112-13
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("As far back as the turn of the century, the Court recognized
that control over the collection and disposal of solid waste was a legitimate, nonarbitrary exercise
of police powers to protect health and safety."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)
("Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order - these are some of the
more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.
Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.").
82. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
83. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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public. 84 But, Peckham went on to say, there must be "a limit to the
valid exercise of the police power by the state," otherwise "police
power" would "become another an delusive name for the supreme sover-
eignty of the state to be exercised free from constitutional restraint."85 It
therefore was the responsibility of the Court to inquire as to whether the
act in question was "enacted to conserve the morals, the health, or the
safety of the people," or was "a mere pretext" for the exercise of
"unbounded power" by the legislature.86
In other words, the question for the Court was whether the act was
"within the police power of the state."87 Justice Peckham's analysis,
however, incorrectly used a list of the acknowledged ends of the police
power - "the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public"
- as a limit on the police power's scope. This of course was not the
only flaw in the Court's analysis in Lochner. But, by framing the scope
of the police power in a narrow fashion, Justice Peckham was able to
hold, after coming to the suspect conclusion that the act in question did
not promote the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the public,88
that "the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this
case." 89 In dissent, Justice Harlan articulated a broad conception of the
police power, correctly describing ends such as "the health and safety of
their citizens" as only a part of state power, and describing health laws
as only a part of what was described by Justice Marshall in the opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden discussed above as "that mass of legislation which
'embraces everything within the territory of a state, not surrendered to
the general government; all of which can be most advantageously exer-
cised by the states themselves.' 90
84. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 57.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 58; see also id. at 61 ("On the contrary, we think that such a law as this, although
passed in the assumed exercise of the police power, and as relating to the public health, or the
health of the employees named, is not within that power, and is invalid."); id. at 64 ("It is
impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed
under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public health or
welfare, are, in reality, passed for other motives."). Other cases striking down police regulations
as violations of substantive due process contained similarly narrow language describing the scope
of the police power. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923) (holding
that law setting minimum wages for women and children exceeded scope of police power);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1915) (holding that a law prohibiting employers from
requiring employees to promise not to join labor unions exceeded scope of the police power, and
framing question and answer as "what possible relation has the residue of the act to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare? None is suggested, and we are unable to conceive of
any.").
90. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 13-20 and accompanying
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Nearly thirty years later the Court decided Nebbia, echoing the
broad conception of the police power described by Justice Harlan in his
Lochner dissent, and definitively marking the end of the Lochner era.
Justice Roberts's Opinion of the Court in Nebbia began where Justice
Harlan left off in Lochner, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden's broad statement
of the scope of state power. 9' Justice Roberts then quoted the broad
conception of the police power articulated in two other opinions dis-
cussed above, Mayor of New York v. Miln and the License Cases.9 2
From Miln, Justice Roberts took Justice Barbour's statement that "it is
not only the right, but the bound and solemn duty of a state, to advance
the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its
general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem
to be conductive to its ends ... [in relation to its] internal police . . . the
authority of the state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive." '9 3 And
from the License Cases, Justice Roberts quoted Justice Taney's opinion
"upon the same subject: 'But what are the Police Powers of a State?
They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions.' ,9
In other words, Nebbia endorsed the broad conception of the police
power as coterminous with state sovereignty articulated in the federal-
ism cases that introduced and defined the term. By broadly articulating
the scope of the police power, Nebbia undercut the limiting definition of
the police power that gave the Lochner Court the rhetorical framework
within which to conclude that the police regulation in question exceeded
the scope of the police power. After reviewing a laundry list of cases
upholding a variety of police regulations, 95 Justice Roberts concluded
that a police regulation would not violate due process so long as it had a
reasonable relationship to a legislative purpose and was neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory.96 In other words, post-Nebbia, the answer to the
substantive due process question framed in Lochner, whether the act in
question was "within the police power of the state,"97 would almost
invariably be "yes."
text (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden); see also Coppage, 236 U.S. at 29-32 (Day, J., dissenting)
(discussing the scope of police power, "the limitations of which no court has yet undertaken
precisely to define").
91. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
92. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
93. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 523-24 (quoting Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102,
139 (1837)); see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing Miln).
94. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 524 (quoting the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583); see supra notes
32-35 and accompanying text (discussing the License Cases).
95. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525-30.
96. See id. at 537.
97. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
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4. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT THE POLICE POWER BASED ON
POLITICAL THEORY
This Section discusses a range of theoretical attempts to define the
police power. The intent here is not to provide a catalog of every defini-
tion ever suggested for the term "police power". Rather, to illustrate one
central point, this Section discusses examples of several types of theoret-
ical definitions of the police power and their shortcomings. The term
"police power" was defined by the Supreme Court to be synonymous
with state sovereignty, and it is misguided to attempt to use political
theory to narrow or refine this constitutional law concept.
a. John W. Burgess
Writing in the late nineteenth century, Burgess clearly was troubled
by the unorderly mass of government power included in the police
power, and complained that he could "find no satisfactory definition of
this phrase, 'police power' in the decisions of the Supreme Court."98 To
remedy this problem, Burgess looked to "modern" political science to
provide a more satisfactory definition of "police power."
Burgess began by tracing the etymology of the word "police" to the
Greek, where the word referred to the state's internal government, as
opposed to its foreign relations.99 He then discussed the police power in
Western European countries, arguing that as these states moved away
from feudalism, governmental authority became concentrated in the
king, with "the police power of the crown [becoming] absolute and iden-
tical with what we now term the sphere of internal government."'" This
absolute authority became despotic, leading to a concern for individual
autonomy. With this concern in mind, Burgess wrote, "The political
science of the present century has resurveyed the field of the police
power, and has brought out four very fundamental distinctions."101
These four points, according to Burgess, were that the police power (1)
is administrative, as opposed to legislative or judicial, (2) is only a
branch of internal authority, and is not equivalent to state internal sover-
eignty, (3) should be limited by constitutional or legislative guidance,
and (4) should be administered on the most local level possible. 02
Burgess's analysis is presented here not to illustrate its merit or
lack of merit as a work of political science. Rather, it is presented as an
98. JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 213
(1890).
99. Id. at 214.
100. Id. at 215.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 215-16.
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illustration of a critical error that other theorists after Burgess have
made, which is to give the term "police power" a theoretical meaning
separate from its legal meaning. In constructing a theoretical model of
the state, a political theorist like Burgess may wish to divide government
power into more orderly subdivisions. The term "police power," how-
ever, was introduced by Chief Justice Marshall to represent a legal con-
cept, the states' power to exercise their sovereign authority. Burgess
argued that the Court, by continuing to use the term police power to
represent this legal concept, maintained an "obsolete" theory of the
police power at odds with modern political science."°3 Burgess may be
correct that the Court's usage is at odds with his theoretical view of the
state, but the Court's usage, as a legal concept, was in no way obsolete
in 1890, and is not obsolete today.
b. Ernst Freund
Ernst Freund's treatise on the police power,"°4 published in 1904, is
perhaps the best-known work on the subject. Freund's definition of the
police power as "the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property"10 5 is superfi-
cially broad enough to appear to be similar to the Supreme Court's defi-
nition of the police power as the states' residuary sovereignty. Freund's
actual conception of the police power, however, was much narrower
than his definition would suggest, and he, like Burgess, erred by defin-
ing "police power" more by reference to political theory than to law.
Unlike Burgess, Freund wrote primarily as a legal scholar, and said
that his definition of the police power was derived from an examination
of "the mass of decisions, in which the nature of the power has been
discussed, and its application either conceded or denied."'0 6 Consistent
with this claim, most of Freund's treatise is devoted to the analysis of
particular cases involving different types of police regulations. But the
beginning sections of the treatise, which contain the meat of Freund's
analysis, discuss the police power in terms of political theory, not case
law. As a result, Freund gave an inappropriately narrow theoretical defi-
nition to the broad legal concept of the police power.
Freund distinguished between "the great objects of government: the
maintenance of national existence; the maintenance of right, or justice;
and the public welfare."'0 7 Of these objects of government, Freund
103. Id. at 216.
104. FREUND, supra note 51.
105. Id. at iii.
106. Id. § 3.
107. Id. § 4.
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argued that the proper end of the police power was to promote the public
welfare, which Freund described in utilitarian terms: "The care of the
public welfare, or internal public policy, has for its object the improve-
ment of social and economic conditions affecting the community at large
and collectively, with a view to bringing about 'the greatest good for the
greatest number."' 108 To Freund, the political state promoted the public
welfare by solving two problems. First, certain conditions beneficial to
all members of the community could not be achieved by individual
effort; the state solves this problem by facilitating "collective communal
action."'09 Second, certain types of individual conduct, while providing
some benefit to the individual, caused a greater harm to the community;
the state solves this problem by "restraint and compulsion exercised over
individuals." "o As Freund's definition of the police power ("the power
of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property")' l I reflects, in his model of the state, the police
power includes only this second type of government action.
Freund' s division of the state's power to promote the public welfare
into regulatory and non-regulatory subgroups is consistent with his more
general view of state power. Like many treatise writers, Freund argued
that there are several generally recognized state powers, each distinct
from the other "in object and content": the military, taxing, eminent
domain, and police powers." 12 Unlike the other treatise writers, Freund
did not see these powers as including all state power; rather he argued
that there "has never been an exhaustive classification of [the state's]
powers,"" 3 implying that there are distinct, unnamed state powers
outside of the limited scope of the named powers. One example of such
an unnamed power in Freund's model of the state is the non-regulatory
power to promote the public welfare.
Thus, while Freund thought that the police power is the broadest
government power, "and therefore necessarily the vaguest,"' " 4 he
rejected the idea that the police power included all of the state's sover-
eign power outside of the narrower scope of the other acknowledged
powers," 5 let alone that the police power included the other powers.
The Supreme Court, however, defined the police power as synonymous
with the state's entire sovereign power. Freund, like Burgess, gave the




112. Id. § 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. § 3.
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term "police power" a theoretical meaning separate from its legal mean-
ing. As used by the Supreme Court, the "police power" includes all of
the state's sovereign power, and at its broadest can be seen to encompass
other state powers. While this power can be theoretically subdivided,
giving one subdivision the name "police power," as Freund did, greatly
confuses matters.
In addition to making the functional claim that the police power
should be limited to regulation, Freund's theory also placed subject mat-
ter limitations on the police power. Freund divided the public welfare
into three subsections: (1) primary social interests (safety, order, and
morals), (2) economic interests, and (3) non-material and political inter-
ests. 116 He, within the tradition of Justice Redfield in Thorpe, noted that
government action to promote the safety, order, and morals "constitutes
the police in the primary sense of the term."" 7 On the other hand, the
pursuit of non-material interests (meaning "moral, intellectual and aes-
thetic")1 and political interests (meaning the operation of government
and promotion of patriotic institutions), Freund argued, are clearly
outside of the scope of the police power.
In between are government acts that promote economic interests.
While Freund acknowledged that "[w]ealth is almost as essential to our
civilization as safety, order, and morals,"" 9 he was doubtful about the
ability of government policies to produce wealth. The safety, order, and
morals of the community could be furthered by government regulation,
but the creation of wealth came from individual effort, and in a capitalist
economy, "governmental activity in the care and control of economic
interests must operate largely as interference and disturbance, as favorit-
ism or oppression."' 2 ° Freund recognized that many government actions
ostensibly aimed at preventing "not only fraud and oppression, but
against disorder, disease and accident,"'' were in fact intended to bene-
fit certain economic interests, or to benefit economically or socially
weak political classes. Such government interference in the economy,
either explicit or implicit, was not to Freund fundamentally legitimate or
illegitimate; rather, such regulations were "still in an experimental
stage,""' and he felt that their legitimacy would evolve over time.
Freund's view on the legitimacy of economic regulations comports
with his view that the police power was not "a fixed quantity," but rather
116. Id. §9.
117. Id. § 10.
118. Id. § 13.
119. Id. § 12.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. § 15.
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"the expression of social, economic and political conditions," which
"must continue to be elastic, i.e., capable of development."'' 23 In this,
Freund was entirely correct. As discussed above, the practical scope of
regulations enacted under the police power has evolved over time. In
the late nineteenth century, regulation of health, safety, and morals was
recognized as legitimate, regulation of the economy was of questionable
legitimacy, and aesthetic regulation was generally viewed as illegiti-
mate. Freund's categorization of the legitimate and illegitimate substan-
tive ends of the police power simply reflected the particular social
situation of his time.
Thus, while Freund correctly acknowledged the evolutionary nature
of police regulation, his conception of the substantive limits of the
police power was flawed. Although he was a legal scholar, Freund's
conception of the police power was based on political theory, not consti-
tutional law. "Police power," however, is a constitutional law concept,
and Freund committed the same error as Burgess.
c. Richard Epstein
In Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1
24
Richard Epstein developed a theory of government regulatory power
nominally based on the political theory of John Locke. Epstein defined
the police power as "those grants of power to the federal and state gov-
ernment that survive the explicit limitations found in the Constitu-
tion." 125  While this definition erroneously states that the federal
government has a police power, 26 it captures the essence of the correct
definition of the police power as the state's residual sovereign power.1
27
Epstein's conception of the police power, however, is much more
limited than this broad definition would indicate. Looking to first prin-
ciples, Epstein argued that it would make no sense for government not to
have some regulatory power. In Locke's political theory, individuals in
the state of nature enter into the political state to gain personal secur-
123. Id. § 3.
124. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
125. Id. at 107.
126. As discussed above, the term "police power" was introduced in federalism cases
delimiting the scope of federal and state power, and it is incorrect to say that there is a federal
police power. See supra notes 7-35 and accompanying text; infra notes 137-38 and accompanying
text; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (holding that there is no
federal police power). The fact that the federal government now exercises something that often
resembles the police power simply is a reflection of the vacuity of contemporary Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, which (with a few laudable recent exceptions) has come very close to
abandoning the principle of a federal government of limited powers.
127. See supra notes 7-35 and accompanying text.
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ity,'2 8 and therefore, Epstein argued, the sole purpose of the Lockean
state is to protect personal security. Under the Lockean approach advo-
cated by Epstein, the police power should therefore be limited to the
protection of personal security. In Epstein's view, the theory behind the
police power is simply the application of the principle of self-defense to
representative government,1 29 and the police power should be under-
stood to protect individuals only "against all manifestations of force and
fraud."' 3 o
Like the theories of Tiedeman, Burgess, and Freund, Epstein's con-
ception of the police power is fatally flawed because it is based on his
idea of what the police power should be, rather than what the police
power is. Whether or not Epstein correctly represents Lockean political
theory, Locke's ideas were not the foundation of the police power.
Rather, the Supreme Court introduced the term "police power" to refer
to a broad conception of state power that in both theory and practice
extends well beyond the protection of individual security.
D. The Expansive Police Power
Hastings, author of the important early work on the police power
discussed above,"' wrote, as one commentator put it, "as a student of
constitutional law rather than as a political scientist."' 3 2 After surveying
the development of the term in the Supreme Court, Hastings concluded
that:
[T]he police power is a fiction. Every judge whom we have seen
attempt to analyze it finds in it Madison's "indefinite supremacy" of
128. EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 108. Epstein's view that the word "police" indicates that the
police power should be understood to be concerned with protecting individual security
inappropriately defines the police power by reference to the modem meaning of "police," rather
than the meaning given to "police" at the time the term "police power" was introduced by Chief
Justice Marshall. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
129. EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 111.
130. Id. at 112. For a similarly limited view of the scope of the police power, see ELLEN
FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 4-5 (1987) (writing that the police
power is justifiable "as a tool for prohibiting criminal activity and setting punishments for
transgressions."). Paul argues that the pursuit of the "general welfare" has only been recently
acknowledged as a legitimate end of the police power. Id. Even Lochner, however, included
"general welfare" in the laundry list of acknowledged ends of the police power, and The License
Cases included similar language. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("[The police
power,] broadly stated, and without, at present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate[s]
to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public."); The License Cases, 46 U.S (5
How.) 504, 536 (1847) ("[T]he police power may be extended to imports and importers, if the
public safety or welfare demands it."). In any event, it is incorrect as a general matter to try to
define the scope of the police power by its acknowledged ends. See supra notes 77-97 and
accompanying text.
131. Hastings, supra note 6.
132. Cook, supra note 2, at 324.
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the state. . . . [T]he term is certainly a mere abstract and collective
one for the state, where regarded as employed in certain functions;
and constant forgetting of this fact has made endless trouble.
1 3 3
Freund took strong issue with this assertion,1 34 but Hastings, while being
somewhat hyperbolic, captured the essence of the police power. In his
1907 essay What is the Police Power?, Walter Wheeler Cook wrote:
Mr. Hastings is in part, at least, right when he says that the police
power is "indefinite supremacy," only we must add that while the
power must always remain "indefinite" it by no means follows that it
is unlimited; we must interpret "indefinite" to mean simply "unde-
fined" and "undefinable," in the sense that what can be done under it
can not be enumerated; that its limits can only be ascertained only by
a process of finding out what can not be done rather than by describ-
ing what can be done. On the other hand, regarded in this way, the
police power is not "a fiction," though it certainly is "the State,
regarded as employed in certain functions."'
' 35
The efforts of Burgess and Freund to narrow the police power into
something more manageable were well intentioned but misguided.
When Burgess wrote that "the police power is the dark continent of our
jurisprudence[,] . . . the convenient repository of everything for which
our juristic classifications can find no other place," t 36 he was clearly
disapproving, but his statement is correct. The police power encom-
passes state power in its entirety, and cannot be limited by
categorization.
So what is the police power? Cook wrote that it is the "residuary
power of government vested by the constitution of the United States in
the respective States." '37 This definition is close, but gets the grant of
power backwards. The police power, properly viewed, is the sover-
eignty of the United States that remained with the states after the grant
of limited powers to the federal government, and it is subject to only
those limitations imposed by the state and federal constitutions. Or, as
the Supreme Court stated in both the License Cases and Nebbia:
"[W]hat are the Police Powers of a State? They are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the
133. Hastings, supra note 6, at 549.
134. FREUND, supra note 51, § 3 ("It has been inferred from this vagueness of the term police,
that the idea of the police power must be equally undefined, and a recent author has gone so far as
to deny its existence, treating it as a fiction, and holding it equivalent to indefinite supremacy.
The inference is, however, unwarranted." (citation omitted)).
135. Cook, supra note 2, at 329.
136. BURGESS, supra note 98, at 136.
137. Cook, supra note 2, at 329.
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extent of its dominions. "138
II. THE POLICE POWER AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
This Part explores the question of when, if ever, an exercise of the
police power constitutes a taking of property within the meaning of the
Just Compensation Clause. It first examines the lessons to be learned
from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the author of the landmark regula-
tory takings case Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,139 who was both a critic
and defender of the police power. It then looks to the historical record
and the text of the Just Compensation Clause to gain insight into when
an exercise of the police power should be considered to be a taking.
Finally, this Part uses the foregoing discussion to make a few observa-
tions that help to clarify the regulatory takings problem.
A. Justice Holmes's Wisdom
Justice Holmes played a pivotal, and at first blush contradictory,
role in the history of the constitutional limitations on the police power.
A career-long student and critic of the police power, Holmes was the
author of the opinion of the Court in Mahon, the first case to hold that an
exercise of the police power could be a taking and unquestionably the
foundation of contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence. 140 At the
same time, Holmes was a dissenter in many Lochner-era substantive due
process cases, eloquently defending the constitutionality of innovative
exercises of the police power.
This Section explores Justice Holmes's understanding of the police
power, first briefly discussing Mahon itself, then placing Mahon in the
context of Holmes's other writings to gain insight into Holmes's view of
the relationship between the police power and the Takings Clause. It
concludes that Justice Holmes's wisdom was to recognize the broad
scope of the police power while rejecting the flawed formalistic doctrine
that held that exercises of the police power could never be takings. In
this way, he recognized that the justification for a police regulation as
harm-preventing was both unnecessary to satisfy due process and insuf-
ficient to satisfy the Just Compensation Clause.
1. PENNSYLVANIA COAL V. MAHON
The facts of Mahon are grounded in the problem of subsidence.
Coal companies would remove all of the coal underlying a particular
138. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934), (quoting the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 583 (1848)).
139. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
140. Id.
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piece of property, sometimes causing the surface to collapse. In 1921,
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Kohler Act, preventing coal
companies from removing all of the coal, thereby creating a risk of sub-
sidence, under a dwelling.' 4' Pennsylvania recognized two distinct
property rights to the coal: the right to mine the majority of the coal, and
the support right, which was the right to mine the coal that, if removed,
would cause the surface to subside. In the case before the Court, the
Mahons owned the surface of the property, while the Pennsylvania Coal
Company owned both the right to mine the coal and the support right.
The Mahons sued to prevent Pennsylvania Coal from removing the coal
that made up the support right. Pennsylvania Coal won in the Court of
Common Pleas, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, hold-
ing that because the Kohler Act was a valid exercise of the police power,
it was not a taking.'42
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes's
famous opinion, held that the Kohler Act violated the Just Compensation
Clause. Despite its brevity, Justice Holmes's opinion discusses a wide
range of cases and legal principles before coming to the conclusion that
"[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."' 4 3 But Holmes declined to provide any general guidance about
how to determine when a regulation has gone "too far," saying that "this
is a question of degree - and therefore cannot be disposed of by gen-
eral propositions.''44
As the first case to hold that an exercise of the police power vio-
lated the Just Compensation Clause, Mahon can fairly be described as
"the foundation of our 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence."1 45 It also is
the clear source of much of the confusion that subsequently has plagued
the regulatory takings debate. Justice Holmes's Opinion of the Court is
short and cryptic, and studiously avoids discussion of prior cases hold-
ing that exercises of the police power could never be takings. Indeed,
Holmes's opinion in Mahon is opaque enough to act as something of a
Rorschach test for a reader's views on regulatory takings, with the con-
tours of the opinion capable of fitting the wide range of theories offered
141. Id. at 412-13.
142. See id. at 412-13. As is often the case, the facts as recounted in the Court's opinion tell
only part of the story, and the problem of subsidence may have been exaggerated in the briefing of
Mahon. For a fascinating discussion of the facts of Mahon, the problem of subsidence, and the
Kohler Act, see WILLAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS - LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
13-45 (1995).
143. Id. at 415.
144. Id. at 416.
145. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
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by subsequent courts and commentators to explain the significance of
the case.146 Looking to the language of Holmes's opinion for the entire
solution to the regulatory takings problem is therefore a questionable,
and probably futile, endeavor.
Whatever else Mahon does, though, there can be no doubt that the
holding that "if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing" 147 rejected the contention made both by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in the opinion below and by Justice Brandeis in dissent that
because the Kohler Act was an exercise of the police power it per se
could not violate the Just Compensation Clause.' 48 In other words,
Mahon rejected the formalistic distinction in place since at least Alger
between exercises of eminent domain, which were considered takings,
and exercises of the police power, which were not.'49
2. MAHON IN CONTEXT
Even though Holmes's cryptic opinion in Mahon itself is a some-
what questionable guidepost, placed in context the holding in Mahon
provides important guidance on the relationship between the police
power and the Takings Clause. This Section revisits Justice Shaw's for-
mal distinction in Alger between exercises of the police power and of
eminent domain, discusses Justice Holmes's career-long suspicion of the
formalistic rule that exercises of the police power could never be tak-
ings, and compares Justice Holmes's views on regulatory takings with
his substantive due process dissents in which he eloquently articulated a
broad conception of the legitimate scope of government power.
a. Alger Revisited and Mugler Visited - The Flaws in a
Formal Distinction
Prior to Mahon, courts and commentators generally had answered
146. Because of the foundational nature of Mahon, a reference to all of the theories put
forward to explain the case would amount to a bibliography of regulatory takings literature. For
articles devoted entirely to Mahon, see Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory
Takings' Jurisprudence': The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes 'ss Opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996); Rose, supra note 1; William Michael Treanor, Jam
For Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813 (1998).
147. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
148. See id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Every restriction upon the use of property
imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed,
and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the state of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking."); Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491,493 (Pa. 1922) ("[T]he
statute before us is a police measure which does not.., contemplate the taking of private property
for public use or the transferring of it from one person to another." (citations omitted)).
149. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (Mass. 1851); see also supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
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the regulatory takings question by making a formalistic distinction
between eminent domain and the police power.' 50 In Alger, Shaw noted
that "it is often difficult to decide whether a particular exercise of legis-
lation is properly attributable to the one or the other of these two
acknowledged powers."'' But Shaw articulated a principled reason for
the distinction (later echoed by Ernst Freund) that the state takes prop-
erty because it intends to use that property, while the state exercises the
police power to prevent a noxious use.' 52 This distinction provided jus-
tification for the contrasting results on the question of compensation,
with the state being required to pay for property that it intended to use,
but not required to pay for the restricting a noxious use.153
Shaw's analysis in Alger made a certain degree of sense in the con-
text of the eighteenth century legal thought, where regulation was firmly
situated in a common law tradition that provided a community-based
moral framework for the exercise of government power. But even the
facts of Alger itself call Shaw's distinction into question. As discussed
above, Shaw's opinion in Alger helped provide the analytical framework
for the evolution of police regulation beyond the common law tradition
by affirming the legislature's line-drawing power to restrict the use of
property, including those uses, like Alger's wharf, that were not intrinsi-
cally noxious in the sense of a common-law nuisance.1
54
Shaw's noxious-use reasoning was echoed in the 1887 case Mugler
v. Kansas, 55 the Supreme Court's leading pre-Mahon statement on reg-
ulatory takings. 156 Mugler involved a takings challenge to a police regu-
lation prohibiting the manufacture of beer. 157 The appellants contended
that their breweries were built when the manufacture of beer was legal,
and that the challenged regulation would make their property value-
less.' -58 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, rejected
the takings challenge. Justice Harlan first made the formalistic observa-
tion that a police regulation "does not disturb the owner in the control or
use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose
150. See Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 792-97.
151. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 86.
152. Id. See also HENRY E. MILLS & AUGUSTUS L. ABBOT, MILLS ON THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 87-89 (2d ed. 1888); FREUND, supra note 51, at 546-47; supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
153. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) at 86. See also FREUND, supra note 51, at 546-47; supra notes
48-49 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
155. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
156. See Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 797.
157. Mulger, 123 U.S. at 623.
158. Id. at 664.
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of it," but instead only restricts certain uses of that property. 159 Justice
Harlan then stated his rationale for denying the property owners
compensation:
The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by individu-
als of their property, as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or
the safety of the public, is not, and, consistently with the existence
and safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened with the condi-
tion that the state must compensate such individual owners for pecu-
niary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted,
by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community. 160
While phrased at first in terms of the need to protect the states' ability to
act in the public interest, Justice Harlan's rationale has a strong moral
component that concludes the quoted passage - the property owners
were not entitled to compensation because they were "inflicting injury
on the community" through a "noxious use of their property."'
161
This moral condemnation of manufacturers of liquor, however, is
undercut by Justice Harlan's observation a few sentences later that "[i]t
is true, when defendants in these cases purchased or erected their brew-
eries, the laws of the state did not forbid the manufacture of intoxicating
liquors." 162 As discussed above, state prohibitions on the manufacture
of liquor were among the first types of police regulation to transcend the
common law regulatory tradition. 163 The liquor laws were remarkable
examples of government power being exercised at the state level to cate-
gorically prohibit an activity that previously had been lawful.' 64 As
Thomas Cooley commented, under prohibition laws, "the Merchant of
yesterday becomes the criminal of to-day, and the very building in
which he lives becomes perhaps a nuisance." 165
The condemnation of a use as noxious provides a moral justifica-
tion for the denial of compensation even if the prohibition of that use
renders the property in question valueless. This moral aspect of
Mugler's regulatory takings analysis is reflected in Treanor's restate-
ment of the Mugler rule: "If something was so harmful as to justify
regulation under the police power, it could be regulated without com-
pensation, regardless of the effect of the regulation on value."' 166 The
flaw in this reasoning is that the police power extends far beyond the




163. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
165. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 51, at 583-84.
166. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 801.
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prohibition on noxious uses. As discussed above, there is no need to
support an exercise of the police power with a harm-preventing ratio-
nale,167 and just because a use is prohibited by an exercise of the police
power does not mean that the use is so noxious as to provide a moral
justification for the denial of compensation regardless of the impact of
the prohibition of that use on the property owner.
Restrictions on the size of wharves or the manufacture of liquor are
certainly within the broad scope of the police power. But building a
wharf is not so inherently harmful to be condemned as a noxious use,
and the prior legality of the manufacture of liquor renders suspect Jus-
tice Harlan's condemnation of that activity as inherently noxious. Using
a more contemporary example, a zoning regulation setting minimum lot
sizes for a residential area can be seen as reducing the environmental
impact and burdens on the community created by housing development.
But it is extreme to say that building a home is intrinsically harmful, or
violates the common-law sic utere doctrine requiring property owners
not to use their property in a manner harmful to their neighbors. 68 A
takings challenge to a restriction on the size of wharves, a prohibition on
the manufacture of liquor or a zoning regulation cannot simply be dis-
missed with a criticism of the property owner for engaging in a noxious
use.
As the modem regulatory state developed in the late nineteenth
century, and the scope of police regulation increasingly transcended its
community-based common law roots, police regulations increasingly
restricted uses of private property that were not so inherently harmful
that they could be condemned as noxious uses. This is not to say that
the evolution of the modem regulatory state represented a radical change
that itself justified a shift away from the rule that exercises of the police
power per se could not be takings; rather, as the practical scope of police
regulation expanded with the evolution of the modem regulatory state,
the flaws inherent in the formalistic doctrine that exercises of the police
power could never be takings became increasingly apparent, particularly
to a career-long student of the police power, Justice Holmes.
b. Holmes's Suspicion of the Police Power
Justice Holmes was no stranger to the police power when Mahon
was decided in 1922. Throughout his career, Holmes had expressed a
167. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
168. Although extreme, this position has been taken in some contemporary takings cases by
those seeking to fit modem land-use regulations into the early line of cases denying compensation
for regulations preventing noxious uses of property. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1051 n.13 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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suspicion that the police power was being invoked to justify restrictions
of property that were constitutionally suspect. In an early review of
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Holmes "suggested that the term
police power was 'invented to cover certain acts of the legislature which
are seen to be unconstitutional, but which are believed to be
necessary.' 169
Holmes thought that certain police regulations prohibiting the man-
ufacture of liquor were particularly suspect, 170 and later referred to Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion in Mugler as "pretty fishy."' 71 At the time Mahon
was decided, Mugler was the leading case standing for the proposition
that an exercise of the police power could never be a taking, 172 and
Mugler was prominently cited by Justice Brandeis in dissent. 173  It is
therefore somewhat surprising that Holmes ignored Mugler entirely in
his Mahon opinion. In a letter written shortly after Mahon was decided,
Holmes regretted his lack of elaboration on the bases of his decision,
and suggested that his disagreement with Mugler was influential in shap-
ing his holding in Mahon.
1 7
1
Holmes's disagreement with the Mugler principle that exercises of
the police power could never be takings, even if they deprive property
holders of all economic use of their property, was also reflected in opin-
169. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 798-99 (quoting Book Review, 6 AM. L. REV.
140, 141-42 (1871-72)). Holmes was similarly suspicious of "the rule that regulations intended to
abate nuisances were necessarily valid, and that rejection reflected his view that the category of
nuisances was hollow. As he wrote in his 1894 article, Privilege, Malice and Intent, the core
nuisance doctrine 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' - 'Use your own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another' - was an 'empty general proposition[ ] ... which teaches
nothing by a benevolent yearning."' Treanor, Jam For Justice Holmes, supra note 146, at 843
(quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1894)).
170. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 340 n.2 (editorial comment by
Holmes) ("The most remarkable cases as to the exercise of [the police] power are those arising out
of the liquor laws.").
171. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 473 (1953) (letter of January 13, 1923).
172. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 800-01 ("At the time of Pennsylvania Coal,
Supreme Court case law was still consistent with the position enunciated in Mugler: If something
was so harmful as to justify regulation under the police power, it could be regulated without
compensation, regardless of the effect of the regulation on value."). Treanor's formulation of the
Mugler rule illustrates its core flaw - as discussed above, a use does not need to be harmful to
justify a regulation under the police power, and the moral imperative of preventing harm cannot
itself justify insulating exercises of the police power from takings challenges. See supra notes
150-68 and accompanying text.
173. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 418 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174. See Howe, supra note 8, at 473 (1953) (letter of January 13, 1923: "But nevertheless
when the premises [of Mahon] are a little more emphasized, as they should have been by me, I
confess to feeling as much confidence as I often do. I always have thought that old Harlan's
decision in Mugler v. Kansas was pretty fishy."). My reading of Mahon is that it is profoundly
contradictory to Mugler, and I therefore have difficulty with Treanor's "thesis that Mahon was
fundamentally consistent with the case law that preceded it." See Treanor, Jam For Justice
Holmes, supra note 146, at 868.
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ions he wrote while on the Massachusetts Supreme Court. More than
thirty years before Mahon, Holmes suggested that "Some small limita-
tions of previously existing rights incident to property may be imposed
for the sake of preventing a manifest evil; large ones could not be,
except by the exercise of eminent domain."'' 75 Ten years later, in Bent v.
Emery, Holmes wrote that:
It would be open to argument at least that an owner might be stripped
of his rights so far as to amount to a taking without any physical
interference with his land. On the other hand, we assume that even
the carrying away or bodily destruction of property might be of such
small importance that it would be justified under the police power,
without compensation. We assume that one of the uses of the conve-
nient phrase, "police power" is to justify those small diminutions of
property rights which, although within the letter of the constitutional
protection, are necessarily incident to the free play of the machinery
of govemment. It may be that the extent to which such diminutions
are lawful without compensation is larger when the harm is inflicted
only as an incident to some general requirement of public welfare.
But, whether the last-mentioned element enters into the problem or
not, the question is one of degree, and sooner or later we reach a
point at which the Constitution applies and forbids physical appropri-
ation and legal restrictions alike, unless they are paid for.
17 6
Writing for the United States Supreme Court in the 1908 case Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter,'77 Holmes continued in this theme, sug-
gesting that a police regulation that deprived an owner of all beneficial
use of property would constitute a taking:
[T]he police power may limit the height of buildings in a city, with-
out compensation. To that extent it cuts down what otherwise would
be the rights of property. But if it should attempt to limit the height
so far as to make an ordinary building lot wholly useless, the rights of
property would prevail over the other public interest, and the police
power would fail. To set such a limit would need compensation and
the power of eminent domain. 78
Holmes's opinion in Mahon therefore can be seen as a reflection of
his career-long rejection of the Mugler principle that exercises of the
police power could never violate the Just Compensation Clause, even if
they rendered the property in question valueless. Holmes stated in both
Bent v. Emery and Mahon that the question of when a police regulation
reached the point of becoming a taking was one of degree.' 7 9 But he
175. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 372-73 (1889).
176. Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 496 (1899).
177. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
178. Id. at 355.
179. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416; Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. at 496.
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also suggested in McCarter that a regulation that rendered property
"wholly useless" would be a per se taking, 80 and held in Mahon that the
Kohler Act violated the Just Compensation Clause by prohibiting all
economic use of the support right owned by the Pennsylvania Coal
Company. '81
Holmes therefore held a consistent view throughout his career that
restrictions imposed through the police power could reach a point where
they become takings and violate the Just Compensation Clause. If, to
the contrary, the "seemingly absolute protection" given to private prop-
erty by the Takings Clause was "found to be qualified by the police
power, the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disappears." '182
c. Holmes's Substantive Due Process Dissents
The suspicion of majoritarian abuse of the police power reflected in
Mahon stands in superficial contrast with Justice Holmes's dissents in
cases where the Supreme Court struck down police regulations under the
doctrine of substantive due process.183 In Lochner, Holmes made his
famous rebuttal to laissez faire constitutionalism, stating that "The 14th
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics ...
[the] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic the-
ory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
state or of laissez faire."'' 4 Holmes went on to eloquently defend the
constitutionality of innovative legislative actions, arguing that the Con-
stitution "is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
180. McCarter, 209 U.S. at 355.
181. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 ("It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise
of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places where
the right to mine such coal has been reserved. As said in a Pennsylvania case, 'for practical
purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to mine it."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview
Coal Co., 256 Pa. 328, 331 (1917))).
182. Id. at 415.
183. See Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 802 ("As one Holmes biographer has
observed, Holmes's approach in Pennsylvania Coal is 'almost exactly the reverse' of his approach
in his due process dissents, in which the police power took precedence over individual rights."
(quoting G. EDWARD WITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 402
(1993))).
184. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see supra notes
72-75 and accompanying text (discussing Spencer's influence on Teideman). Holmes's
substantive due process dissents make it suspect to impugn Mahon as the product of "an
overwhelmingly conservative Supreme Court." Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 802. It
simply is wrong to dismiss Mahon as "an erratic holdover from a discredited era of laissez faire
constitutionalism." Hart, Land Use Law, supra note 36, at 1156. Justice Stevens's attempt to tar
Mahon and regulatory takings with the Lochner brush is similarly misplaced. See Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As to the "cult of Holmes" referred to by
Hart, count me a card-carrying member. See Hart, Land Use Law, supra note 36, at 1156.
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accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel,
and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the ques-
tion whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of
the United States."'
' 85
Holmes's positions in Mahon and his substantive due process dis-
sents, however, are not inconsistent. Holmes understood that the Tak-
ings Clause and the Due Process Clause ask different questions. Months
after writing for the majority in Mahon, Holmes dissented in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital.'86 Holmes agreed that the police regulation in
question could violate a specific constitutional provision: "For instance
it might take private property without just compensation."' 87 But the
question before the court was not whether the regulation was a taking,
but rather whether it was contrary to the "vague contours" of the Due
Process Clause. 8 8 Holmes concluded that "the law in its character and
operation is like hundreds of so-called police laws that have been
upheld," and was therefore valid.' 89 Justice Holmes echoed this conclu-
sion several years later in another substantive due process case, writing
that "[t]he truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when
compensation is due, the Legislature may forbid or restrict any business
when it has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it."' 90
Using the language of Justice Peckham in the opinion of the Court
in Lochner, substantive due process asks whether the act in question is
"within the police power of the state?"'' Despite his career-long suspi-
cion of the police power, Holmes invariably answered the substantive
due process question "yes," deferring to the majoritarian decision-mak-
ing process even where he had doubts about the wisdom of a particular
statute.' 92 Holmes understood that the Takings Clause, -in contrast, asks
a different question: whether the government act in question takes prop-
erty for public use, and therefore requires the payment of just compensa-
tion. For Holmes, the answer to this question - when a "regulation
goes too far,"' 9 3 to the point where it becomes a taking - was to be
determined on a case-by-case basis, but was to be answered "yes" if
regulation rendered property valueless.
In Mahon, Holmes's problem with the Kohler Act was not that it
185. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
186. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
187. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
190. Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1926)
(Holmes, J. dissenting).
191. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
192. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
193. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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went beyond the scope of the police power in the substantive due pro-
cess sense. 19 4 Rather, Holmes held that the Kohler Act was an illegiti-
mate exercise of the police power because it rendered the support right
owned by Pennsylvania Coal valueless without compensation, and there-
fore violated the Just Compensation Clause.' 95 Justice Holmes's wis-
dom was to correctly recognize the broad scope of the police power
while rejecting the flawed formalistic doctrine that held that exercises of
the police power could never be takings, and to recognize that the justifi-
194. Some courts and commentators have labeled Mahon a substantive due process case in an
unconvincing attempt to discredit it as kin to Lochner. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
407 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brauneis, supra note 146 (passim); see also Treanor, Jam For
Justice Holmes, supra note 146, at 826-28 (discussing Stevens's and Brauneis's analyses).
Holmes's language in Mahon is admittedly muddy, and Holmes does use due process language
throughout his opinion. But at its core, Mahon is a takings case. Holmes wrote:
" "When [the diminution in value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain
the act." 260 U.S. at 413 (emphasis added);
" "The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it
is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use
without compensation." Id. at 415 (emphasis added);
" "The General rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. (emphasis
added).
Simply put, "taking," "public use" and "compensation" are terms from the Just Compensation
Clause, not the Due Process Clause, and Holmes used these terms to discuss takings concepts, not
substantive due process concepts. Although it is fair to criticize Holmes's opinion for its lack of
coherence, Holmes was evaluating the constitutionality of the Kohler Act using a takings analysis,
and Mahon cannot be dismissed merely by invoking the pejorative "Lochner."
Treanor has also labeled Mahon a substantive due process case. See Treanor, Jam For
Justice Holmes, supra note 146, at 856. Although his analysis is more sympathetic to Holmes
than those of Stevens and Brauneis, Treanor is able to suggest that Holmes took a deferential
balancing approach to the takings question by lumping Mahon into Holmes's substantive due
process canon. See id. at 856-61. But while Holmes was deferential to government regulation on
substantive due process questions, he was not deferential on the takings question.
The centerpiece of Treanor's analysis is the idea that in Mahon, Holmes drew on concepts
from cases involving businesses affected with the public interest to introduce the concept of
diminution of value into a substantive due process analysis that previously would have simply
asked if the act was within the scope of the police power. Id. at 856-57. Holmes, however, had
little patience for the doctrine of business affected with the public interest, viewing it as a largely
meaningless concept. See id. at 852. Dissenting in Tyson & Brother v. Banton, Holmes wrote:
[T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest and has been devoted to
the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable
to the sufferers. The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when
compensation is due, the Legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it has
a sufficient force of public opinion behind it.
273 U.S. 418, 446 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). In other words, Holmes took the
same deferential approach to the scope of government power in cases involving the doctrine of
businesses affected with the public interest as he did in other substantive due process cases. See
supra note 192 and accompanying text. As the language of Mahon quoted above makes clear,
however, Holmes was not deferential on the separate question of whether the government had
taken property without just compensation.
195. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-16.
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cation of a police regulation as harm-preventing was both unnecessary to
satisfy due process and insufficient to satisfy the Just Compensation
Clause.
B. History and Meaning - Interpreting the Just
Compensation Clause
Mahon raises two obvious questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion: Is it correct that exercises of the police power can violate the Just
Compensation Clause, and, if so, under what circumstances do they do
so? This Section discusses the origin and meaning of the Just Compen-
sation Clause as it relates to these two questions. The history of the
clause has been thoroughly documented by William Michael Treanor,
196
and I rely heavily on Treanor's historical analysis. Looking at the same
historical record, however, I come to a significantly different conclusion
than Treanor regarding the interrelationship between the Just Compensa-
tion Clause and the police power.
1. HISTORY
The Just Compensation Clause was written, as was the rest of the
Bill of Rights, by James Madison. Unlike the other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, however, the Just Compensation Clause was not
requested by the state conventions held to ratify the Constitution, 97 and
the direct historical record of the creation of the Just Compensation
Clause is therefore relatively sparse. The historical context of the
clause's creation combined with Madison's writings, however, provide
important insight into the clause's meaning.
a. Historical Context
While Madison included the Just Compensation Clause in the Bill
of Rights on his own initiative, the idea of a compensation requirement
was not a radical Madisonian innovation in American constitutionalism.
The Vermont and Massachusetts state constitutions both included com-
pensation requirements, as did the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
As Treanor documents, these precursors to the Just Compensation
Clause can be seen as responses to certain historical events. Vermont
was originally part of the colony of New Hampshire, and when the
English government transferred Vermont to the New York colony, the
New York colonial government refused to recognize the Vermont land
196. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1. For an alternative analysis of the history of the
Takings Clause, see Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct,
Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far," 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999).
197. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 791.
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grants issued by the New Hampshire government. 98 Vermonters' out-
rage at New York's attempted thievery is apparent in the preamble to the
Vermont Constitution, 19 9 and this outrage was manifested substantively
in the Vermont Constitution's just compensation clause.2°°  In Massa-
chusetts, a proposed constitution was rejected in 1778 because it failed
to adequately protect private property. The framers of the 1780 constitu-
tion responded to this concern by including property qualifications for
voting and state office holding, which were demanded by the town meet-
ings that rejected the 1778 constitution, and a takings clause, which was
not demanded in the town meetings. 20 1  Given the lack of demand for
this takings clause, it is likely that in seeking to add additional protection
of private property, the framers of the 1780 constitution simply copied
the idea of a takings clause from the Vermont constitution.2 °2 The tak-
ings clause in the Northwest Ordinance, which required compensation
when "public exigencies" made it necessary to take property "for the
common preservation" suggest that this clause aimed at uncompensated
takings by the military.20 3
The uncompensated seizures by the military that seem to have
inspired the takings clause in the Northwest Ordinance were a source of
great concern during the revolutionary era,2" and were the government
abuses of private property that was most likely in the minds of the
ratifiers of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. Treatise
writer St. George Tucker, who was well positioned to comment on the
ratification of the clause,2 °5 suggested that the Just Compensation Clause
198. Id. at 828.
199. Id. at 828-29.
200. Id. at 829. The clause reads: "That private property ought to be subservient to public
uses, when necessity requires it; nevertheless, whenever any particular man's property is taken for
the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent of money." VT. CONST. cl. II.
201. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 830.
202. Id. at 830-31. Treanor suggests that it is possible that the Massachusetts takings clause,
like that in the Northwest Ordinance, was inspired by uncompensated takings by the military
during the revolutionary war. Id. at 832. This alternative explanation is helpful to Treanor's
attempt to show that the takings clauses were intended to remedy only certain types of government
actions that were uniquely subject to political process failure, and that the takings clauses
therefore did not represent a general fear that majoritarian decision-making would inadequately
protect private property interests. See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. The most
obvious explanation for the Massachusetts takings clause, though, is that it was copied from the
Vermont constitution as part of an attempt by the Framers of the 1780 constitution to assuage
Massachusetts citizens' fear that the majoritarian legislature would inadequately protect private
property. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 830-31. In any event, a better view of the
particular events that inspired the takings clauses is that they were simply the governmental
abuses of private property that illustrated the need for constitutional protection of private property.
See infra text accompanying note 229.
203. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 831.
204. Id. at 831.
205. Id. at 835-36.
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"was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of
obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impressment,




Because James Madison was the author and chief promulgator of
the Just Compensation Clause, his views on the purpose of the clause
and on the necessity of constitutional protection of property hold partic-
ular importance in interpreting the clause, and this importance is
increased by the scarcity of other sources that can be used to understand
the clause's meaning. Madison was a great defender of private property,
and his writings have often been relied on by authors advocating a broad
reading of the Just Compensation Clause that would require compensa-
tion for any government action that redistributed wealth. Madison's
view of the Just Compensation Clause, and his more general political
theory, however, support a more complex and limited view of the
clause's meaning.
Madison's understanding of the Just Compensation Clause was that
it would only apply to physical takings of property. This understanding
is reflected in his original phrasing of the Just Compensation Clause,
which read "No person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his property,
where it may be necessary for public use, without just compensation."2 °7
This understanding is also reflected in the essay Property,2° 8 in which
Madison criticized Alexander Hamilton's economic program. In Prop-
erty, Madison argued against re-distributive government actions, asking
how a government that provides compensation for "direct violations" of
private property could engage in act that "indirectly violate[ ]" private
property.2 °9 Madison's position in Property is consistent with his
description of the Just Compensation Clause in his speech proposing the
Bill of Rights, in which he indicated that the clause would serve two
distinct functions, establishing a judicially enforceable rule against
uncompensated takings while also having a moral or educative function
that would guide the whole community.2 0 In Property, Madison argued
that while the redistributive government actions that he was criticizing
206. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCES TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Rothman Reprints 1969) (1803).
207. JAMES MADISON, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 201 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds, 1979).
208. JAMES MADISON, Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
209. Id. at 267-68.
210. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 837.
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did not violate the judicially enforceable rule created by the Just Com-
pensation Clause, they did violate the moral rule that was the basis for
the clause.21'
As Treanor notes, Madison's disparate treatment of direct and indi-
rect violations of property raises an obvious question: If Madison felt
that both direct and indirect violations were wrong, why did he create a
judicial rule that applied only to one and not the other?2" 2 The answer is
suggested by Madison's broader political theory. In Federalist Ten,
Madison explained that each of the factions within society uses the polit-
ical process to seek its own advantage. Because the interests of the dif-
ferent factions often conflict, the successful promotion of one faction's
interest in the political arena often comes at the loss of another faction.
The structure of the national government, however, provided some pro-
tection against the abuse of property because the legislators elected at
the national level would tend to be people "of general respectability"
who would tend to be sympathetic to propertied interests, and because
on the national scale, the diversity of interests and factions made less
likely the formation of a majority intent on harming the interests of other
citizens. In other words, Madison believed that government actions
involve winners and losers, but that the political process provided some
structural protection of property owners.2t 3
Despite this belief that the political process provided some protec-
tion to property owners, the inclusion of the Just Compensation Clause
in the Bill of Rights clearly indicates that Madison thought that property
needed additional protection. In particular, Madison felt that two types
of property, interests in land and in slaves, would not be adequately
protected by the political process. Madison believed that the United
States would experience a population explosion, and that landowners
would soon become a minority.21 4 Madison also believed that landless
employees of manufacturers would vote as their employers instructed,
and that "the future belonged not to 'Landlords & Tenants,' but to 'the
great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the members
employed by them.' ",215 Landowners were therefore likely to become a
minority unable to rely on the political process to protect their interests.
Madison was similarly concerned that the political process would be
insufficient to protect the interests of slaveowners.21 6
211. Id. at 839.
212. See id. at 840.
213. See id. at 843.
214. Id. at 849.
215. Id. at 850 (quoting James Madison, Note to his Speech on the Right of Suffrage (1821), in
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 452 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
216. Id. at 851-54.
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Madison's view of the interaction between property and the politi-
cal process thus had two parts. Madison believed that property owners
would be naturally impacted by the political process, sometimes nega-
tively and sometimes positively, but that the process as a general matter
offered adequate protection to property owners. At the same time,
Madison believed that in some circumstances, the political process
would fail and, as a result, property owners would suffer such a severe
negative impact - their property being taken - that additional protec-
tion was necessary.
c. The Significance of the History
Treanor looks at the historical evidence and concludes that the
background understanding, as embodied by the history of the state tak-
ings clauses, the framer's intent, as embodied by Madison's writings,
and the ratifiers' intent, as embodied by Tucker's statement, all indicate
that the Just Compensation Clause was concerned with redressing politi-
cal process failure.217 The abuse of Vermont landowners at the hands of
the New York Legislature and impressment by the military during the
revolutionary war were particular instances of process failure, while
Madison's fears about landowners and slave owners reflected the poten-
tial for political minorities to suffer great losses as losers in the political
process. While I agree with the conclusion that the Just Compensation
Clause was concerned with remedying political process failure, Treanor
and I come to dramatically different conclusions as to the significance of
the political process in interpreting the meaning of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause.
2. POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE MEANING OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSE
a. Treanor's Model
Treanor uses a translation model of fidelity to give meaning to the
Just Compensation Clause. The goal of the translation model, as stated
by Treanor, is "to identify the ends that the Constitution's framers
sought to advance and then interpret[ ] a constitutional provision in a
way that best advances those ends in today's world. '2 18 The translator
begins by determining the historical context, and meaning within that
context, of the constitutional provision being studied. The translator
then identifies the factual presuppositions behind the original under-
standing that have changed, and "reinterprets the text in light of changed
217. Id. at 855.
218. Id. at 857.
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circumstances, altering the original reading as little as possible while
seeking its modem 'equivalent." 9
Treanor begins his application of this model with the original
understanding, discussed above, that the Just Compensation Clause
required compensation when the government interfered with the physi-
cal possession of property.22 ° Moving to changed circumstances,
Treanor argues that none of the factual bases for the original protection
of physical possession still hold true. Slave ownership is obviously no
longer a concern. 22 1 Landownership, Treanor argues, also no longer
needs the protection of the Just Compensation Clause. Madison's fears
that landowners would become a minority and that employees would
vote as their employers wished have not come true,22 2 and the unique
factual situation behind the Vermont takings clause is no longer pre-
sent.2 23 While seizures by the military in wartime are still a risk, such
situations are unique and extraordinary. 224 Treanor also finds significant
the public choice theory analysis that landowners are particularly well
suited to defend their interests in the political arena. 2 5 Thus, because of
changed circumstances the vulnerable property interests that were the
focus of the original understanding "either no longer exist or are now
adequately protected by [the political] process. 2 26
Based on these changed circumstances, Treanor proceeds with his
translation by attempting "to determine what property interests must
now be protected if we are to be consistent with the original purposes of
the clause. '227 From the premise that the original purpose of the Just
Compensation Clause was to guard those interests uniquely subject to
process failure, Treanor turns this task into identifying those situations
where property owners are particularly vulnerable to process failures.
Looking to public choice theory and footnote four jurisprudence,
Treanor concludes that such vulnerability exists, and compensation
should therefore only be due, when a government action singles out a
property owner or adversely impacts a discrete and insular minority. 228
219. Id..
220. Id. at 859.
221. Id. at 863.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 865.
224. Id. at 866.
225. Id. at 863-64.
226. Id. at 866.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 866-78; see also Treanor, Jam For Justice Holmes, supra note 146, at 874
("Evidence of a process failure would be, in particular, that a statute or regulation singles out an
individual, or that it disproportionately affects people who live outside the jurisdiction or, as in
environmental racism cases, that it burdens discrete and insular minorities.").
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b. Compensation for the Losers in the Political Process
While I agree with Treanor's account of the history of the Just
Compensation Clause, I disagree with his interpretation of the clause's
meaning on several levels, but most basically on the significance of the
relationship between the original understanding and process failure.
The original understanding of the Just Compensation Clause only
required compensation when a government action interfered with the
physical possession of property, and both the historical context and
Madison's writings suggest that the clause was intended to protect prop-
erty owners from suffering a severe loss in the political process. Look-
ing at this historical record, Treanor argues that the clause protected only
physical possession because it was uniquely subject to process failure.
229
This assertion leads to the conclusion that forms the critical premise for
the rest of his analysis: that the Just Compensation Clause should be
read to protect only those property interests that are uniquely vulnerable
to process failure.
The original understanding and the concern with process failure,
however, suggests a very different conclusion to me. A more simple
explanation of the original understanding is that compensation was only
required for physical expropriation not because physical possession was
particularly vulnerable, but because all of the examples of process fail-
ure that lead to enactment of the Just Compensation Clause were physi-
cal expropriations. The attempted taking of Vermont property by the
New York legislature and military expropriation during the Revolution-
ary War both involved physical expropriation, as did the hypothetical
danger to slaveholders that partially motivated Madison.
Moreover, the text of the Just Compensation Clause makes it clear
that it is not a process-oriented provision. Unlike a provision directed at
avoiding process failures detrimental to property owners - for example,
a property qualification for voters - the Just Compensation Clause sim-
ply provides a remedy for the victim of the process failure. The text
requires compensation for every taking of property, and does not require
an examination of the political process that led to the taking. As Treanor
himself notes: "[T]he original understanding did not involve making the
individuals who were likely to suffer process failure better off than those
protected by the political process. Rather, the Takings Clause was
intended to put everyone who suffered the same injury on the same foot-
ing: Everyone whose property was physically taken received compensa-
tion. '230 The Just Compensation Clause, then, is not concerned with
229. Treanor, Political Process, supra note 1, at 854.
230. Id. at 872.
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how or why the process failure occurred. Instead, it is concerned with
the impact a government action has on the property owner. If the impact
is sufficiently severe (which necessarily could only result from a process
failure), then compensation is due.
Because the examples of process failure that inspired the Just Com-
pensation Clause were physical takings, the original understanding was
that compensation was only required for physical takings. But it is clear
today - and was clear to Justice Holmes throughout his career - that a
government action can severely and negatively impact a property owner
without interfering with physical possession. A local government seek-
ing to preserve a certain parcel of land as open space can exercise the
police power to forbid development of that parcel or can take the parcel
by eminent domain.23' In either case, the impact of the government
action on the property owner essentially is the same. It would be an
absurd exercise of formalism, and would go against Madison's intent to
provide a remedy for particularly severe losses caused by process fail-
ures, to hold that of two government actions that had essentially the
same impact on the property owner, one was a taking because it was an
exercise of eminent domain while one was not because it was an exer-
cise of the police power. Justice Holmes's holding in Mahon that an
exercise of the police power can be a taking therefore is consistent with
the intended meaning of the Just Compensation Clause.
The more difficult question, though, is where to draw the line
between exercises of the police power that go "too far" and those that do
not. The Takings Clause does not provide direct protection of property;
rather it provides compensation for the deprivation suffered by the prop-
erty owner. It stands to reason that the impact of a government action
on the property owner should be measured in terms of the thing that the
Just Compensation Clause protects, that is: value.
The history of the clause suggests that it was not intended to protect
ordinary diminutions in value; Madison's writing in Property indicates
that he was aware that in its ordinary function the political process could
negatively impact property holders, and did not intend compensation to
be due for every such loss.232 Rather, the historical record of the Just
Compensation Clause suggests that compensation should be due when a
government action has essentially the same impact on the property
231. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652-53 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 142, at 52-54 (discussing an
example of use of the police power as a substitute for eminent domain in a municipality's effort to
preserve open space).
232. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
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holder as physical expropriation - that is, compensation should be due
if the government action renders property valueless.
C. Lessons for Contemporary Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
Following Justice Holmes's lead in Mahon, the Supreme Court's
contemporary takings jurisprudence has tended to eschew clear tests,
and instead is characterized by "ad hoc, factual inquiries" '233 involving a
wide range of factors. The result is something of a cacophony of com-
peting ideas and theories. Rather than addressing contemporary takings
jurisprudence in its entirety, this Section follows on the foregoing dis-
cussion of the history and nature of the police power and the history of
the Takings Clause by making two observations that may help to clarify
the regulatory takings debate.
First, much of the confusion in contemporary takings analysis is the
result of misunderstandings of the nature and history the police power.
Second, the history and text of the Just Compensation Clause are consis-
tent with the results of recent Supreme Court cases holding that an exer-
cise of the police power that renders property valueless should be
considered a taking, while exercises of the police power that result in
lesser diminutions of value are not takings.
1. MISUNDERSTANDING THE POLICE POWER IN CONTEMPORARY
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Part of the confusion endemic to contemporary takings jurispru-
dence is attributable to a lack of clarity about the nature and scope of the
police power. Often, the regulatory takings question is asked incor-
rectly, leading to confusion between the substantive due process ques-
tion (is the government act within the scope of the police power?) and
the takings question (does the act take property without just compensa-
tion?). This confusion in turn leads to an unwarranted focus on the char-
acter of the government act in the takings analysis. Further, confusion
over the relationship between the police power and the prevention of
harm pervades recent takings cases and commentary.
As often is the case with regulatory takings problems, the confusion
on takings law about the police power can be traced in significant part to
Justice Holmes's cryptic opinion in Mahon. There, Justice Holmes
observed that the Kohler Act had "very nearly the same effect for consti-
tutional purposes as appropriating or destroying [the coal]," '23 4 and that,
as a result, the impact of the Act on Pennsylvania Coal reached the point
where the Act could not be "sustained as an exercise of the police
233. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
234. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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power. '2 35 Instead, "there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act."
2 36
In other words, Holmes held that when a police regulation went too
far, it would violate the Just Compensation Clause, and would have to
be replaced with an exercise of eminent domain accompanied by com-
pensation, in order to be constitutional. Thus, at the same time he was
holding that a police regulation had violated the Just Compensation
Clause, Holmes's language perpetuated a formal distinction between
exercises of the police power and of eminent domain. Using Holmes's
phraseology, valid exercises of the police power would never require
compensation, because those exercises of the police power that violated
the Just Compensation Clause would, like the Kohler Act, be invalid.
As a result of Holmes's choice of language, takings jurisprudence
developed a distinction between "takings" and "valid exercises of the
police power." For example, Joseph Sax observed in his influential arti-
cle Takings and the Police Power that the phrase "police power" was
"used by the courts to identify those state and local governmental
restrictions and prohibitions which are valid and which may be invoked
without payment of compensation." '237 This terminology is correct in a
technical sense if it is understood that exercises of the police power that
violate the Just Compensation Clause are invalid; ergo, valid exercises
of the police power are not takings and do not require compensation.
But this formulation of the takings question is misleading because it is
imprecise about the reason for the validity of the government act in
question: is it valid in the substantive due process sense (i.e., the act is
within the scope of the police power) or in the takings sense (i.e., the act
does not violate the Just Compensation Clause)? Because of the broad
scope of the police power, the answer to the substantive due process
question will almost invariably be "yes," and the substitution of the sub-
stantive due process question for the takings question would lead to a
return to the Alger/Mugler formalistic rule, rejected in Mahon, that exer-
cises of the police power can never be takings.238
Although obscured in some respects by his choice of language in
235. Id.
236. Id. at 413.
237. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964).
238. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412 (reversing holding of lower court that finding that "statute
was a legitimate exercise of the police power" was dispositive of the takings issue). Indeed, the
recent takings case that focuses most strongly on the nature of the act in question can be read as
advocating a return to the Mugler rule. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 488-90 (1987). But even Keystone, best seen as a full-out attack on Mahon that has
since convincingly been repulsed in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council (505 U.S. 1003 (1992)), is
consistent with the rule that an act that renders a piece of property valueless will be considered to
be a taking. 480 U.S. at 493-502; see infra note 256.
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Mahon, Justice Holmes's wisdom was to understand that the substantive
due process and takings inquiries ask different questions, and the effect
of Mahon was to hold that a police regulation (the Kohler Act) had vio-
lated the Just Compensation Clause.23 9 Contemporary takings jurispru-
dence has begun to move away from the concept that an exercise of the
police power that violates the Just Compensation Clause is invalid and
must be replaced with an exercise of eminent domain, instead embracing
the concept of inverse condemnation and recognizing that an exercise of
the police power can directly take property.240 This recognition clarifies
that the regulatory takings question that should be asked is, "Does the
act take property without compensation?" rather than, "Is the act a tak-
ing or a valid exercise of the police power?"
When the regulatory takings question is asked properly, it becomes
apparent that the character of the government act should not have a sig-
nificant role in the takings analysis, which focuses on whether the act
takes property (measured by impact on property owner), not why it takes
property (measured by the nature of the act). Unless it has a direct bear-
ing on whether property has in fact been taken, as in a case involving
physical invasion,24" ' the character of the act should not be a factor in the
takings analysis.2 42 Recent Supreme Court takings cases have consid-
ered the character of the government act at issue, largely as a result of
substantive due process issues from earlier cases improperly creeping
into the takings analysis.243 The resulting test, which has been articu-
239. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
240. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
314-19 (1987); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425
(1982) ("The Court of Appeals determined that [the act] ... is within the State's police power.
We have no reason to question that determination. It is a separate question, however, whether an
otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid."); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652-53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn.
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
242. The nature of the act is relevant to the question of whether the act meets the "public use"
requirement. However, following the order of the text of the Just Compensation Clause, this issue
should be decided after it has been determined whether the act amounts to a taking of property. If
and when this question is reached, it will almost invariably be answered "yes" in a regulatory
takings case, because the public use requirement has been interpreted to be coextensive with the
scope of the police power. See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). If
for some reason the "public use" requirement was not met, then the act would be invalid in the
substantive due process sense - the government may not take property for a private use
regardless of whether compensation is paid.
243. The inclusion of the character of the government act in the Supreme Court's
contemporary takings analysis can be traced in significant part to two cases: Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). See Penn.
Central, 438 U.S. at 125-27 (citing Nectow and Goldblatt); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261
(1980) (citing Nectow). Both Goldblatt and Nectow, however, are predominantly substantive due
process cases. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 591 (property owners claimed that regulation "takes
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lated in many recent takings cases as "land-use regulation does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state inter-
ests,"' 2 44 is a substantive due process test that has no relevance to the
takings question. 45 These same cases, however, have been clear that
even if an exercise of the police power satisfies the "legitimate state
interest" test, it will result in a taking if it "denies all economically bene-
ficial or productive use" of the property in question. 46 This latter test
properly focuses on whether the act has taken property, rather than on
the nature or generality of the act.247
their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Nectow,
277 U.S. at 185 ("The attack upon the ordinance is that, as specifically applied to plaintiff in error,
it deprived him of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment."). Goldblatt involved a challenge to a restriction on gravel mining below the water
table. The Court first held that if the "ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police
powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it
unconstitutional." Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592. The Court then immediately observed that "[t]his is
not to say, however, that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation." Id. at 594 (citing Mahon).
Thus, the Court's first observation about the validity of the police regulation referred to the
constitutionality of the act in the substantive due process sense, and the Court was clear that the
takings analysis asks a different question that focuses on the burden of the act on the property
owner. The Court found that the act satisfied due process (because there was no evidence in the
record to suggest that the act was unreasonable) and that it was not a taking (because there was no
evidence that it reduced the value of the property in question). Id. at 594-96. Nectow invalidated a
zoning regulation on purely due process grounds, based on "the express finding of the master...
that the health, safety, convenience, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city
affected will not be promoted by the disposition made by the ordinance of the locus in question."
Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188. Though a finding that the act was a taking may have been supported by
the master's finding that the parcel in question had been rendered essentially valueless, the Just
Compensation Clause did not factor into the Court's analysis. Id. at 187.
244. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) (quoting Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; see also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-90 (1987); Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at
125. The only relevance that this substantive due process inquiry should have on the takings
analysis should be in the context of determining whether the act satisfies the "public use"
requirement of the Just Compensation Clause, which logically should be determined after it has
been determined whether or not the act amounts to a taking. See supra note 241.
245. See supra note 238 and accompanying text; see also John D. Echeverria, Does a
Regulation That Fails To Advance A Legitimate Governmental Interest Result In A Regulatory
Taking, 29 ENv-L. L. 853 (passim) (1999) (discussing substantive due process nature of takings
test based on state interest analysis).
246. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Notlan, 483 U.S. at 834; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495;
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (holding that regulation may be a taking "if
it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property.").
247. The generality of an act (i.e., whether it is broadly applied or singles out individual
property owners) is an appropriate consideration for a due process analysis, but not a takings
analysis. The strongest articulation of a generality analysis in recent Supreme Court takings cases
came in Justice Stevens's dissent in Lucas. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071-75 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens supports his process argument with the observation that "[t]his
principle of generality is well rooted in our broader understandings of the Constitution as designed
in part to control the 'mischiefs of faction."' Id. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
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While the character of the act should generally not be a factor, the
character of the use being restricted may be relevant to the takings anal-
ysis. As discussed above, the broad scope of the police power far tran-
scends the prevention of harm, and although virtually any government
act can be given a harm-preventing justification, the police power
includes, within its scope, the regulation of many uses that are not mor-
ally repugnant.248 Justice Holmes therefore recognized that the charac-
terization of a police regulation as harm-preventing was neither
necessary to satisfy substantive due process nor sufficient to defeat a
regulatory takings claim.2 49 Certain uses, however, are sufficiently nox-
ious to be considered to be nuisances that can be abated without com-
pensation, regardless of the impact on the property owner. Because the
property owner has no right to engage in a noxious use, a police regula-
tion prohibiting such uses would not take anything from the property
owner, and therefore would not be considered to be a taking, regardless
of the severity of the impact on a property owner.2  Under this analy-
sis, however, it is the nature of the prohibited use, not the nature of the
regulation, that is relevant.25'
Federalist No. 10, p. 43 (G. Wills ed. 1982) (J. Madison)). Unlike other constitutional protections,
however, the text and history both indicate that the Just Compensation Clause is not a process-
oriented provision, see supra note 241 and accompanying text, and Justice Stevens's reference to
Federalist No. 10 therefore is misplaced.
248. See Lucas, 505 U.S at 1022-26.
249. See supra text accompanying note 194. Much of the confusion about the relevance of the
prevention of harm to the regulatory takings analysis is attributable to Holmes's failure in Mahon
(which he later regretted) to squarely confront Mugler. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying
text. Indeed, although subsequent courts and commentators have tried to square Mahon and
Mugler, the better view is that the two decisions are fundamentally inconsistent. Indeed, this
inconsistency has continued in contemporary takings jurisprudence, with Keystone representing an
attempted repudiation of Mahon and resurrection of Mugler, and Lucas representing a repudiation
of Mugler and a reinforcement of Mahon.
250. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with."); see also id. at 1029 ("Any limitation so severe [as to
prevent all economically beneficial use of land] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership"). The opinion of the
Court in Lucas asserts that "'prevention of harmful use' was merely our early formulation of the
police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution
in value." Id. at 1026. As discussed above, the police power does not require a harm-preventing
justification, and it would be more accurate to say that the "harm preventing" language was the
rationale used to deny compensation, even when it was difficult to truly condemn the use as
immoral or illegal. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text. The history of the Just
Compensation Clause also indicates that regulatory diminution of value that falls short of the
equivalent of a physical expropriation (i.e., total diminution in value) does not require
compensation. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
251. The rule that the abatement of truly noxious uses does not require compensation can of
course be articulated in terms of the nature of the government act - i.e., that exercises of the
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2. THE RESULTS, IF NOT THE ANALYSIS, OF RECENT TAKINGS CASES
ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORY AND TEXT OF THE JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSE
The text and historical record of the Just Compensation Clause sup-
port the rule, most clearly applied in Lucas, that an exercise of the police
power that renders an owner's property economically valueless will be
considered a taking. 2  This rule reflects a practical observation that the
government can take property through an exercise of the police power.
As Justice Holmes held in Mahon, the Kohler Act had "very nearly the
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
[the coal]. 2 53 Justice Brennan echoed this observation in a dissenting
opinion in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-
use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in
order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal con-
demnation or physical invasion of property. From the property
owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his land is con-
demned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use in
its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of all
beneficial use of it. From the government's point of view, the bene-
fits flowing to the public from preservation of open space through
regulation may be equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge
through formal condemnation or increasing electricity production
through a dam project that floods private property. Appellees implic-
itly posit the distinction that the government intends to take property
through condemnation or physical invasion whereas it does not
through police power regulations. But "the Constitution measures a
taking of property not by what a State says, or by what it intends, but
by what it does." It is only logical, then, that government action
other than acquisition of title, occupancy, or physical invasion can be
a "taking," and therefore a de facto exercise of the power of eminent
domain, where the effects completely deprive the owner of all or
most of his interest in the property.254
police power aimed at abating noxious uses are not takings. Because the rationale for this rule is
that the property owner does not have a property right to engage in a noxious use, the analysis is
more correctly phrased in terms of the nature of the use being abated.
252. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-19; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)
("[A] regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the Takings Clause." (internal quotation omitted)); Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a
taking if the ordinance ... denies an owner economically viable use of his land."); supra notes
245-246 and accompanying text. The trial court's conclusion in Lucas that the government act in
question had rendered the property valueless appears to have been correct. See FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 142, at 59-61.
253. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
254. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 652-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Because the Just Compensation Clause protects value, reduction in value
is the correct measure of the impact of an exercise of the police power
on a property owner, and because the deprivation of all economic use is
the functional equivalent of physical expropriation, requiring compensa-
tion in these circumstances is consistent with the historical record of the
Just Compensation Clause.255
Similarly, the contemporary Supreme Court cases that have
addressed the merits of a regulatory takings claim and held that no tak-
ing had occurred have all involved diminutions in value that fell short of
total takings,256 and are consistent with Madison's understanding that
the political process would result in adverse impacts on property owners
that would not be compensable.25 7 Thus, although the analysis in con-
temporary Supreme Court regulatory takings cases sometimes borders
on incoherence,258 the results of these cases are consistent with the text
Hart has posited that the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence is grounded on the
idea that land use was generally unregulated in the colonial era, and is therefore undercut by
evidence that colonial land use regulation was in fact widespread. See Hart, Land Use Law, supra
note 36, at 1100; Hart, Colonial Land Use, supra note 36, at 1252-53. Hart's thesis exaggerates
the importance of the absence of colonial land use regulation to the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence, which is founded in a much more concrete way on Holmes's observation,
eloquently reinforced by Justice Brennan, that a state can take property through exercises of the
police power. Hart is correct that the pervasiveness of land use regulation in the colonial era
undercuts the argument that the Takings Clause requires compensation for any economically
burdensome land use regulation, and as discussed above, Madison understood that the political
process would result in the passage of laws that might negatively impact property owners. See
supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text. But other than the abatement of noxious uses, early
American land use regulations fell far short of rendering the affected property valueless. See Hart,
Land Use Law, supra note 36, at 1107-31. Therefore, early American land use regulation is
consistent with the rule that an exercise of the police power that renders property valueless is a
taking.
255. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
256. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616 (denying takings claim where regulation "permit[ed] a
landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel."); Agins, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (denying takings claim where "the challenged ordinances allow the appellants to construct
between one and five residences on their property."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (denying takings claim where some use of property right was
possible); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (denying takings claim where there
was "no evidence in the present record which even remotely suggests that prohibition of further
mining will reduce the value of the lot in question."); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-502 (1987) (unconvincingly distinguishing Mahon but denying
compensation on ground that police regulation did not deprive owners of all economic use of their
property); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-97 (1981)
(denying takings claim largely on ripeness grounds, but noting that "in the posture in which these
cases comes before us, there is no reason to suppose that 'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining
Act has deprived appellees of economically viable use of their property."). The Court may have
been wrong in some of its factual assumptions, and Agins, in particular, lends itself to an analysis
that the government's actions were the equivalent to the exercise of eminent domain. See
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 142, at 52-54.
257. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
258. Compare Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (holding that police regulation prohibiting mining of
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and historical record of the Just Compensation Clause, finding takings
where an exercise of the police power has rendered property valueless
but not where the government act has resulted in a lesser diminution of
value.259
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to solve some of the confusion in con-
temporary regulatory takings jurisprudence by clarifying the nature and
scope of the police power and examining the relationship between the
police power and the Takings Clause. A correct understanding of the
broad scope of the police power clarifies and simplifies matters by dem-
onstrating that the character of the act in question should have no role in
the takings analysis. Rather, the takings question should focus on the
impact of the government act on the property owner - i.e., does the act
take the owner's property? Because the Just Compensation Clause pro-
tects value, the impact of the government act should be measured by the
reduction in value of the affected property. Consistent with Madison's
intent, a taking should only be found if the exercise of the police power
results in a severe impact on the property owner equivalent to a physical
expropriation. Thus, the regulatory takings question should be simply
phrased as "has the government act rendered the property in question
valueless?" A simple test, easily applied, that surprisingly enough
would reach the same result as the Supreme Court's recent takings cases,
but without all the mess.
support right was a taking) with Keystone, 480 U.S. 470 (holding that similar police regulation
prohibiting mining of support right was not a taking). A contributing source of the incoherence in
regulatory takings case law is the Court's unwillingness to recognize contradiction where it
plainly exists. While Treanor correctly observed that none of the opinions in Lucas suggests any
conflict between Mugler and Mahon, the two cases are profoundly contradictory. See supra note
174; Treanor, Jam For Justice Holmes, supra note 146, at 868. Similarly, Justice Scalia's
Opinion of the Court in Lucas avoided discussion of conflict with Mugler even as it implicitly
overruled one of Mugler's core holdings. Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (holding that
"regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land" cannot be newly enacted by the
legislature without compensation to the property owner) with Mugler, 123 U.S at 668-70 (holding
that newly-enacted legislation prohibiting manufacture of beer did not require compensation even
though it rendered property valueless),
259. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. This result is reflected in a jury
instruction recently affirmed by the Supreme Court:
For the purpose of a taking claim, you will find that the plaintiff has been denied all
economically viable use of its property, if, as the result of the city's regulatory
decision there remains no permiissible or beneficial use for that property. In proving
whether the plaintiff has been denied all economically viable use of its property, it is
not enough that the plaintiff show that after the challenged action by the city the
property diminished in value or that it would suffer a serious economic loss as the
result of the city's actions.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 700 (1999) (citing 10 Tr. 1288, 1303-
06 (Feb. 9, 1994)).
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